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Health care expenditures have risen dramatically in the last several decades.  
Various agents have responded by reforming their practices in an effort to protect their 
budgets.  My dissertation studies the implications of two of these changes on both quality 
and expenditure dimensions.  
The first chapter introduces and briefly discusses these topics.  The second 
chapter discusses the implications of hospital mergers.  A large body of research has 
examined their financial consequences, while little has analyzed the effect on patient 
health and experiences.  This chapter aims to fill this gap, utilizing 17 years of hospital 
discharge data to study the impact of 40 California hospital mergers on changes in 
treatment choices and health outcomes.  I use an empirical strategy that is based on 
geography of residence to enable a market level analysis.  My findings indicate that 
hospital mergers result in increased utilization of intensive treatments for heart disease, 
such as bypass surgery and angioplasty.  This result could be driven by increased access 
to intensive procedures as well as a change in hospital treatment practices.  I also find 
  
evidence of a small increase in inpatient mortality which could be driven by an increase 
in average travel time to the nearest facility offering cardiac services. 
In chapter three, co-authored with Mark Duggan, we analyze the implications of a 
widespread Medicaid reform: contracting out health care treatment of Medicaid recipients 
to managed care organizations.  State governments rapidly shifted Medicaid enrollees 
into managed care during the 1990s, perhaps partly as a response to increasing Medicaid 
expenditures.  This reform has not previously been studied at the national level.  We use 
state-level aggregate administrative data for the years 1991-2003 in conjunction with a 
unique data set on mandatory managed care enrollment policies to estimate the average 
national impact.  Results suggest that this policy may have increased the expense of the 
Medicaid program, particularly for HMO-style insurance plans.  We extend our analysis 
to investigate the impact of these policies on enrollment decisions.  Using CPS data, we 
find mixed responses to mandatory managed care policies, though all changes in take-up 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Health care expenditures have been rising steadily and dramatically for 
decades.  The trajectories of overall and per capita health expenditures are exhibited 
in Figure 1.1.  Health expenditures comprise a rising share of overall spending as 
well.  In 1980, national health expenditures comprised 9.1 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP).  By 2007, this share increased to a historical high of 16.2 percent of 
GDP.  The trajectory of health expenditures as a share of GDP is displayed in Figure 
1.2.   
 This increase in expenditures affects all levels of budgets, from household to 
firm to government.  In February 2009, a tracking poll conducted by the Kaiser 
Family Foundation found that 19 percent of individuals faced one or more difficult 
consequences because of medical bills, such as being contacted by a collections 
agency or an inability to pay for necessities.  The same poll found that 45 percent of 
individuals were ‘very’ concerned about the prospect of having to pay more for health 
insurance and health care.  This figure is up from 40 percent in March 2007 (KFF 
2007), suggesting that concern over health expenditures pre-dates the current 
recession.  Despite pervasive difficulties in paying for health care, out-of-pocket 
expenditures accounted for a falling share of private consumer spending across time, 
as evidenced in Figure 1.3.  Rising insurance costs necessitate rising premium rates, 
which in turn causes financial difficulties for employers that offer health insurance 
benefits to their employees.  This may be one of the driving factors behind the falling 




 State and federal budgets are also struggling under increasing health care 
costs.  A large fraction of health expenditures are devoted to the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs, which comprise nearly 20 percent and 15 percent, respectively, 
of total national healthcare expenditures in 2007.  Over one-fifth of state budgets are 
devoted to paying Medicaid expenditures, and Medicaid and Medicare account for a 
slightly larger of a share of federal expenditures at 22.9 percent (CMS 2009, CBO 
2009).  In addition to public insurance spending, federal, state, and local governments 
are large employers and offer substantive benefits packages to their employees, 
including health insurance.  Thus they also face similar challenges as private 
employers with rising insurance premium costs. 
 There are a number of factors that have contributed to the soaring spending on 
health care.  The Kaiser Family Foundation provides an overview of many of these 
factors in their recent primer on health care costs (2009b).  Broadly speaking, many 
of these factors fall into the following categories: an ability to spend more on health 
care within wealthier countries, populations that are aging and more susceptible to a 
variety of chronic diseases, and increases in the share of expenditures paid by 
insurance rather than individuals.  In addition, as new technology is developed, it is 
easy to utilize regardless of cost effectiveness compared to older alternatives.  This 
statement applies to innovations in both pharmaceuticals and medical devices.  In 
addition, as insurance pays a higher share of medical expenditures, there are fewer 
incentives for physicians and patients to consider the cost of a course of treatment. 
 In response to these pressures, a number of actors in the health care sector 




Employers have responded to rising benefit costs by reducing cost sharing for 
premiums and offering less generous insurance plans (KFF 2009b).  And the 
likelihood of small employers offering health benefits has fallen as well (GAO 2007).  
Another adaptation is the development of managed care insurance, which has been 
able to reduce expenditures without necessarily affecting utilization of services 
(Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse 2000).  Managed care insurers form networks of 
providers, and negotiate lower rates in exchange for allowing a provider to treat its 
enrollees.  This, in turn, squeezes the financial position of providers.   
Providers of many types have responded by consolidating, enabling them to 
both take advantage of scale economies and expand their negotiating power with 
managed care insurers.  The last several decades have been a very dynamic period in 
the health care sector for all of these reasons, and it is important to analyze and assess 
how each of these changes affects the various dimensions of health care.   
 The second chapter of my dissertation addresses this secondary response to 
the growth in health care expenditures.  In response to the many factors squeezing 
their budgets, many hospitals closed or merged with another facility.  From the years 
1989 to 1996, the number of independent general acute facilities fell by 561 (HHS 
1999, Bazzoli, et al 2002).  One-third of these facilities continue to operate as a 
satellite of another facility as a result of consolidation.  This wave of consolidation 
began in the 1980s and continued through the early 2000s.  While consolidation 
occurred at the ownership level with the growth of hospital systems, these statistics as 




transactions involve a complete integration of two previously independent hospitals 
and will be referred to as mergers for the remainder of this dissertation.   
A large literature has studied the financial consequences of hospital mergers, 
but few have investigated how patients were affected.  This chapter aims to fill this 
gap, utilizing individual-level California hospital discharge data from the years 1990-
2006 to study the effect of forty mergers completed during this time period.  Previous 
research has found small increases in readmission rates and small, transitory increases 
in mortality rates in merging hospitals (Ho and Hamilton 2000, Capps 2005).  Unlike 
previous research, I study the effect of mergers across all patients in affected markets.  
I use a geographic approach, in which outcomes are examined as a function of 
exposure to a merger.  This approach has the advantage of capturing three types of 
effects: (1) changes in quality at the merging facilities, (2) changes in quality at 
hospitals differentially affected by the mergers, and (3) the impacts of patient 
reallocation in response to the mergers.  Results of this kind may better inform policy 
because they capture the market-level effect of mergers.  Hospital-level analyses such 
as those listed above would miss effects (2) and (3) listed above, and may also 
misestimate (1) if there is endogenous movement into or out of a merged hospital. 
To examine the effect of hospital mergers, I focus on patients with a heart 
disease diagnosis.  This enables me to analyze how mergers affect treatment patterns 
in addition to health outcomes.  I find that hospital mergers induce small though 
statistically significant increases in mortality.  These increases appear to be driven by 
an increase in average distance to care rather than differences in quality of care or 




of intensive surgical treatments, such as bypass surgery and angioplasty, in favor of 
medical management of heart disease.  Patients who were more exposed to a merger 
through the smaller of the two hospitals often experienced an increase in access to 
these specialized procedures, and were thus more affected by the merger.  However, 
patients whose exposure came from the larger of the two hospitals, and were thus 
much less likely to experience an increase in access, also experienced an increase in 
utilization of these intensive procedures.  This result suggests that merged facilities 
and/or their competitors increased their treatment of surgical procedures for heart 
disease patients. 
Public insurance programs also responded to increasing budget stress with 
program reforms intended, at least in part, to reduce the growth of expenditures.  
Chapter 3 studies the impact and effectiveness of one such reform1.  As stated above, 
Medicaid expenditures comprise a growing share of both state and federal budgets.  
One of the most widespread reforms enacted by states has been to shift enrollees from 
traditional fee-for-service (FFS) style Medicaid into Medicaid managed care plans.  
Capitated payments provide a financial incentive to the managed care plan to reduce 
utilization, potentially reducing expenditures.  In 1991, 10.8 percent of Medicaid 
recipients were enrolled in a managed care program.  By 1995, this fraction exceeded 
one-third, surpassing one-half in 1998, and reaching over 60 percent in 2005.  This 
steady increase came from both increases in the number of states creating Medicaid 
managed care programs and from within-state expansions of eligibility across 
counties. 
                                                 




I study the effect of this program on expenditures and on overall Medicaid 
enrollment.  The impact of managed care on expenditures is theoretically unclear 
because, while private managed care insurers have had success in negotiating lower 
provider rates, Medicaid reimbursement rates are traditionally low and may be 
difficult to reduce further (Gruber 2004).  While managed care insurers may have 
encouraged utilization of preventive care, there is little incentive to do so because of 
substantial churn in the Medicaid population.  The spell of program eligibility is often 
short (Duggan 2004), reducing the benefits of improved health to the insurer.  In 
addition, many states embedded a variety of protections for safety-net providers into 
their managed care programs.   
The scope of state programs varies along several dimensions: managed care 
penetration rates, mandatory vs. voluntary enrollment, and type of managed care 
program.  Thus the effect of Medicaid managed care (MMC) may vary across states.  
I use state-level aggregate administrative data in conjunction with a unique 
instrument for managed care enrollment to study the average effect of MMC on 
expenditures.  This instrument is intended to bypass the selection bias that comes with 
voluntary managed care enrollment.  Alternate specifications split penetration by 
program type: health maintenance organization (HMO) vs. primary care case 
management (PCCM).  These specifications enable an analysis of one of the broader 
differences between state programs.  Overall, I find that managed care does not 
reduce the fiscal burden of the Medicaid program.  If anything, that burden has 




Another concern that has been raised with Medicaid managed care policies is 
that take-up of Medicaid benefits may fall if eligible individuals decide that managed 
care reduces the attractiveness of the program.  These decisions could increase the 
vulnerability of an already vulnerable population.  I use CPS data to address this 
question, and find little evidence to substantiate this concern.  Mandatory 
participation in more restrictive forms of managed care induced small declines in 
Medicaid take-up, though most substituted into other insurance plans.  The response 
to mandatory participation in less restrictive forms of managed care was mixed, 
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Chapter 2: The Impact of Hospital Mergers on Treatment 
Intensity and Health Outcomes 
 
Abstract: A large body of previous research has examined the effect of 
hospital mergers.  Virtually all of this research has focused on financial 
outcomes, such as hospital prices and profitability, rather than health care 
treatments and health outcomes.  This paper aims to fill this gap, utilizing 17 
years of hospital discharge data from the most populous state to study the 
impact of hospital mergers on changes in treatment choices and health 
outcomes.  This study period is long enough to analyze 40 hospital mergers 
and how their impact changes over time.  I use an empirical strategy that is 
based on geography of residence rather than choice of hospital to detect the 
effects of a merger across all patients in affected markets.  My findings 
indicate that hospital mergers result in an increase in utilization of intensive 
treatments for heart disease, such as bypass surgery and angioplasty.  This 
result could be driven by an increase in access to intensive procedures as well 
as an increase in the likelihood of merged hospitals prescribing these 
procedures.  I also find evidence of a small increase in inpatient mortality 
which could be driven by an increase in travel time to the nearest facility 
offering cardiac services. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Consolidation is a common response to financial and competitive pressures in 
many markets.  In most of these markets, such as gasoline, airlines, and 
telecommunications, the primary concern is the financial implication: will the merger 
result in a significant price increase?  Markets related to healthcare, however, such as 
hospitals, involve additional complications.  For example, both dimensions of 
demand for hospital services are affected by third parties: treatments are prescribed 
by physicians and consumers are shielded from the full costs by insurance companies.  




to disentangle.  In addition, an increasing percentage of individuals is insured by 
government programs, for which hospitals cannot affect prices.  This trend is likely to 
continue with the aging of the baby boomer population into Medicare eligibility.  
Hospitals also provide a service whose quality matters a great deal for both survival 
and quality of life.  Thus, the impact of consolidation in hospital markets on prices 
may be increasingly less relevant while the importance of the impact on other 
dimensions, such as quality of care, may grow. 
Recent decades have witnessed a large number of hospital consolidations.  
Nationally, 74 mergers were completed between 1983 and 1988, at an average rate of 
12 mergers per year.  This pace doubled into the 1990s: an additional 190 mergers 
were completed between 1989 and 1996 (Bazzoli, et al 2002).  For the purposes of 
this paper, a hospital merger is defined as two legally independent facilities 
consolidating under a single license2.  This transaction involves unifying previously 
separate hospital boards and staffs into single organizations.  Legally and financially, 
the merged hospital is a single entity operating out of multiple physical campuses.   
Similarly to research conducted on mergers in other markets, most of the 
hospital merger analysis has focused on their financial consequences: price and cost 
efficiency.  Much less attention has been paid to the implications for quality and 
patient experiences.  Previous research has found that hospital mergers are likely to 
improve the financial position of a hospital through price increases and economies of 
                                                 
2 Hospitals can also consolidate at the ownership level into systems.  This transaction involves far less 




scale3.  These financial benefits should enable a facility to invest in additional human 
and physical capital.  Patients are likely to benefit from these investments.  In 
addition to creating a single legal entity out of two, hospital mergers often involve 
some level of service consolidation between the two campuses.  This results in an 
increase in patients and procedures seen and performed by a particular physician or 
team.  A lengthy literature suggests that this increase in volume should result in 
improved quality and health outcomes4.  While both of these mechanisms suggest 
mergers should improve quality, several researchers have found that hospitals in more 
competitive environments have higher quality and better outcomes5.  If this is a causal 
relationship, it suggests mergers may reduce quality through reducing competition.  
Thus, the effect of hospital mergers on quality is an empirical question. 
To date, two papers investigate the direct impact of hospital mergers on 
measures of quality (Ho and Hamilton 2000; Capps 2005).  These studies use similar 
methodology in that both analyze the difference in quality measures before and after a 
merger as compared to non-merging hospitals.  Both only study 10-11 mergers across 
a five-year time period, which could reduce the power of their analyses.  Neither finds 
mergers to have a significant effect on quality.  One concern with this approach is that 
patient choice may respond to hospital mergers if there is a perception that mergers 
affect quality.  Thus, hospital level analyses could be subject to bias caused by 
changes in patient composition.  Changes in patient choice could also result in a 
reallocation of individuals to hospitals that are a better (or worse) fit, which could 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Dranove and Lindrooth 2003 and Conner, et al 1997 on cost efficiences and 
Devers, et al 2003; Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite 2003; Dafny 2008; and Antwi, Gaynor, and 
Vogt 2008 on price increases. 
4 See Gaynor 2006 for a summary of this literature. 




affect outcomes as well.  Another potential concern is that comparing merging to non-
merging hospitals requires assuming that non-merging hospitals do not respond to the 
merger.  For example, Dafny (2008) found that non-merging hospitals raise prices 
following a merger between nearby hospitals.  Non-merging hospitals may respond to 
the reduction in competition that comes with a merger along the quality dimension as 
well. 
The current paper builds on this previous literature in a number of ways.  To 
address many of the concerns detailed above, I use a geographic approach.  I measure 
health outcomes at the zip code level to assess how all patients are affected by a 
hospital merger.  This approach has the benefit of including all potentially affected 
patients in the analysis.  I exploit variation across zip codes in exposure to a merger to 
analyze its average effect.  Exposure is measured as the share of patients in the zip 
code using the merged facility.  Patients of non-merging hospitals are also potentially 
affected by the merger, and they are more likely to be affected when merging 
hospitals are closer and have a larger share of the market.   
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the heterogeneity in the exposure measure for the 
1999 merger between Fresno Community Hospital and Valley Medical Center of 
Fresno.  Darker zip codes are ones that are more exposed to the merger.  While I 
cannot disentangle the effect of changes in the merged facility from changes in local 
non-merging facilities or patient sorting, I am able to analyze the market-level effect 
of a merger, including ripple effects to other facilities.  This latter effect might be 





My analysis includes the 40 mergers that are completed during the years 
1990-2005 throughout the state of California.  This longer time period enables me to 
analyze how the impact of a merger changes with time.  I focus on patients admitted 
with a heart disease diagnosis.  Heart disease is a serious condition that is often 
treated with surgery in conjunction with pharmaceuticals to prevent future heart 
attack and heart failure events.  Targeting this group enables me to investigate 
whether hospital mergers induce different treatment patterns for intensive procedures 
such as bypass surgery and angioplasty.  While inpatient mortality is a concrete 
measure of quality, it does not capture the mechanism through which any effect 
occurs.  Expanding the analysis to treatment intensity may offer additional insight 
into how patient experiences are affected by a merger.   Using inpatient discharge 
data through 2006, I find that hospital mergers induce more intensive heart disease 
treatment and larger mortality rates.   
In a sample zip code with 20 percent of patients discharged from the merged 
facility, intensive treatment utilization increases by 2.9 to 3.5 percent and inpatient 
mortality increases by 1.6 to 2.7 percent.  These effects are not transitory and 
continue to exist five years after a merger and beyond.  The increase in mortality 
appears to be driven by patients whose distance to care increased because of the 
merger, while increases in treatment intensity appear to be partially driven by 
increases in the likelihood of prescribing these procedures.  Increasing usage of 
intensive procedures may be another way for merged facilities to improve their 
financial position because intensive heart surgeries are often one of the more 




inpatient mortality does not appear to be driven by the additional risk from 
performing additional intensive procedures, the data do not enable me to discern 
whether the additional surgeries lead to longer term benefits. 
The remainder of this document is organized as follows: Section 2.2 will 
provide a background on hospital mergers and related literature.  Section 2.3 
describes the data used in this project, and section 2.4 provides an overview of 
California hospital mergers during this time period.  Section 2.5 details the empirical 
methodology and provides the first set of results.  Alternate specifications are detailed 
in section 2.6, and section 2.7 concludes with a discussion of results and future work. 
 
2.2 Background on Hospital Mergers 
While hospital consolidation existed in the 1980s, its pace nearly doubled 
during the 1990s.  For example, there were 190 hospital facility mergers between 
1989 and 1996, while there were only 74 between 1983 and 1988 (Bazzoli et al, 
2002).  This represents an increase in the average annual number of mergers from 12 
to 24.  These mergers are defined as two facilities consolidating under a single facility 
license.  The facility whose license is retained is considered the parent facility while 
the facility whose license is relinquished is considered the satellite facility.  There 
were a variety of factors that contributed to this wave of mergers, though there is no 
consensus on the relative importance of each factor.  Vogt and Town (2006) suggests 
that technological advances both shifted many inpatient procedures to an outpatient 
setting and reduced the length of stay necessary for other procedures that remained in 




consequence of creating excess capacity in hospitals across the board.  Mergers 
provide an avenue for hospitals to consolidate services and reduce capacity without 
being subject to state regulations because the reorganization is taking place within a 
single facility (Dranove and Lindrooth 2003). 
In addition to reduced demand, hospitals also reduced payments for hospital 
services.  These reductions came from government-sponsored insurance and private 
insurers alike.  Medicare began restricting hospital payments with the institution of 
the Prospective Payment System (PPS) in 1984, and tightened the purse strings in 
1988 by strengthening the requirements for elevated payments.  This policy change 
resulted in significant negative margins on Medicare patients (Coulam and Gaumer 
1991).  The 1990s also saw the advent of managed care insurance.  Enrollment in all 
types of managed care increased over the 1990s.  HMO penetration in Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas rose from just over 10 percent in 1990 to roughly 30 percent in 1999; 
it fell slightly to approximately 28 percent by 2000 (Vogt and Town 2006).  Even 
though managed care enrollment is shifting from HMOs to less stringent varieties of 
managed care, such as PPOs, these more flexible plans still create networks of 
preferred providers and negotiate fixed reimbursements to hospitals in exchange for 
being included in the network6.  Out of three studies of the relationship between 
managed care penetration and hospital consolidation, only one finds a positive 
correlation between the two7.  Based on the prevalence of qualitative anecdotes on the 
                                                 
6 The structure of these reimbursements vary by plan and include payment by DRG and per-diem 
payments for care that vary by the service type, such as medical/surgical, ICU, acute care, etc. (Capps 
and Dranove 2004). 
7 Dranove, Simon, and White (2002) find a positive relationship between managed care penetration 





relationship between managed care and consolidation, Vogt and Town (2006) 
suggests that the ‘threat’ of managed care, if not actual managed care penetration, 
could have influenced the decision to merge. 
As explained in section one, hospital mergers are likely to impact quality of 
care through three mechanisms: their ability to improve their financial standing 
through achieving cost efficiencies and through negotiating higher prices with 
insurance firms; the implications of reduced competition in the hospital market; and 
improvements in physician skill due to the volume-outcome relationship.  I expand on 
each of the three mechanisms below and demonstrate the potential each has to impact 
hospital quality. 
2.2.1 Cost Efficiencies 
If hospitals can achieve economies of scale through merging, improvements in 
quality of care may be possible because hospitals have more resources to devote 
towards quality provision or because quality becomes less expensive to provide.  The 
general consensus of the literature is that hospital mergers lead, at worst, to slower 
cost growth and possibly induce significant cost savings.  Most of the research does 
not explicitly distinguish between consolidation at the ownership level (into systems) 
and at the facility level; this research is summarized in Dranove and Lindrooth 
(2003).  One exception is the Conner et al (1997) study which investigates the impact 
of consolidation on cost changes over a 9-year period.  Unsurprisingly, the authors 
find much larger cost savings for non-system hospitals and for hospital pairs that are 




Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) expands upon this literature by explicitly 
studying system acquisitions and facility mergers separately and constructing a 
control group using propensity score matching.  Each consolidation is matched to 10 
non-merging hospitals based on their propensity to merge.  Data from the American 
Hospital Association and from Medicare cost reports for the year before the merger 
and four years following the merger are used to estimate initial cost savings and the 
persistence of these savings over the next several years.  The authors find that system 
acquisitions result in small and statistically insignificant cost savings.  However, 
facility mergers result in approximately 14 percent cost savings that persist for at least 
4 years after the merger. 
2.2.2 Price Increases 
Hospitals also have the potential to improve their financial position through 
merging if consolidation allows them to negotiate larger reimbursements from 
insurance providers.  The benefit of this strengthened negotiating position will vary 
across service offerings because Medicare prices are regulated and certain diagnoses 
are disproportionately experienced by Medicare beneficiaries8.  But, previous 
research suggests that hospitals do not compete at the diagnosis level, suggesting that 
the financial benefits of price increases will be spread throughout the hospital9 (Dafny 
2005). 
                                                 
8 For example, approximately 60% of heart attacks and 75% of strokes in California from 1992-1995 
were experienced by Medicare beneficiaries (Ho and Hamilton 2000). 
9It is possible that hospitals will use these increases in revenue to compete for private payer patients 
rather than for overall increases in quality, but it is also possible that quality increases targeted at 




The experiences and opinions of health care workers are suggestive of a 
causal relationship between hospital consolidation and price increases.  Devers, et al 
(2003) uses an extensive set of surveys of various types of health care workers in 12 
major healthcare markets to identify whether hospital consolidation leads to increased 
bargaining power with insurance firms.  The authors find that the ‘on-the-ground’ 
opinions of health care workers is that consolidation has improved hospital 
bargaining power, leading to an increase in the negotiated prices between hospitals 
and insurance firms. 
Recent empirical research strengthens this finding.  Capps, Dranove and 
Satterthwaite (2003) use a structural approach to estimate willingness-to-pay for 
including each of the hospitals in the San Diego metropolitan area in a managed care 
insurance plan network.  This measure is utilized to estimate hospital profits and 
prices as well as predicted prices in the event of a merger.  The authors find that a 
merger between two of the three hospitals has the potential to increase prices by over 
10 percent.  Dafny (2008) finds a similar result in a national analysis.  She uses a 
combination of rival analysis and a distance-based instrument for hospital mergers 
and finds that a merger between two rival hospitals increases price at a nearby non-
merging hospital by approximately 40 percent.  Given that the non-merging hospital 
was unlikely to experience a demand or supply shock outside of the rival merger, this 
finding suggests that merging hospitals increase their prices after a merger.  Antwi, 
Gaynor, and Vogt (2008) provides some evidence to the contrary, finding that the 
large increase in California hospital prices from 1999-2005 is not correlated to 




hospital closures during this time period that would increase concentration, but may 
have a different effect on prices, potentially convoluting the results. 
2.2.3 Competition and Quality 
There are several theories that suggest hospital quality should increase with 
competition.  In general, the mechanism behind this relationship is that consumers 
face little, if any, difference in out-of-pocket expenditures across hospitals, leading 
hospitals to compete for patients on a quality dimension instead.  These theories 
include the medical arms race theory and one that models the Medicare market and 
utilizes a regulated price.  Both of these theories are explained in depth in Gaynor 
(2006). 
 Most of the recent empirical research on hospital competition and quality 
suggests that competition increases quality.  One of the seminal papers on this topic, 
Kessler and McClellan (2000), uses a patient choice model to create a plausibly 
exogenous predicted Herfindahl Index (HHI) measure.  The authors use this measure 
to estimate the impact of competition on Medicare heart attack outcomes in 1985, 
1988, 1991, and 1995.  They find that more competitive markets are associated with 
greater treatment intensity in the 1980s and with lower treatment intensity in the 
1990s.  HMO penetration is identified as the reason for this difference. 
 Two more recent papers corroborate these findings.  Kessler and Geppert 
(2005) follow a similar methodology, but allow treatment and outcome coefficients to 
differ for high versus low risk Medicare heart attack patients.  They find that high risk 
patients are treated more intensively and experience better health outcomes in more 




experience similar outcomes.  Sari (2002) expands beyond the Medicare subset and 
estimates the impact of county-level market shares and competition on a set of quality 
indicators constructed by the Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research (AHRQ) 
using the AHRQ National Inpatient Sample data set for the years 1992-1997.  Sari 
instruments for shares with patients’ average incomes and for HMO penetration with 
the unemployment rate and the percent of large firms in the market. Sari finds that 
increases in market share and overall concentration worsen quality of care for 3 out of 
7 sets of quality indicators.  There is no effect on the remaining four indicators10.   
Not all research in this area finds competition to be quality-improving.  
Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) uses a similar methodology as Kessler and 
McClellan (2000) to analyze the impact of competition within different payer types in 
Los Angeles and find that increases in competition for Medicare patients are 
associated with increased mortality rates for both heart attack and pneumonia 
patients.  This difference in findings could stem from differences between Los 
Angeles and national averages.  In general, this literature investigates how hospitals 
respond to the level of competition they face while ignoring how the competitiveness 
of the environment developed.  To the extent that this relationship is causal, these 
findings suggest that hospital mergers could reduce quality of care through this 
mechanism. 
                                                 
10 Negative and significant coefficients are for adverse/iatrogenic results, wound infection, and 
inappropriate surgical utilization; no effect is found for mortality results, obstetrical results, major 




2.2.4 Volume-Outcome Relationship 
Hospital mergers often incorporate a consolidation of service offerings.  At 
the very least, physician and nursing staffs are unified between the two facilities.  If 
gained experience and shared expertise have the impact of improving outcomes, then 
hospital mergers have the potential to improve health outcomes and quality of care 
through this channel as well.  Gaynor (2006) provides a review of the recent volume-
outcome studies within the economics literature.  Two studies instrument for bypass 
surgery volume with the number of area bypass surgery patients and the number of 
area hospitals that provide the surgery.  Both found a significant causal effect 
between volume and inpatient mortality, and one of the studies identified that this 
impact comes from current volume rather than from built up experience (Seider, 
Gaynor, and Vogt 2004 and Gaynor, Seider, and Vogt 2005).  Ho (2002) reports 
similar results, finding small improvements in inpatient mortality and in the need for 
consequent bypass surgery when a hospital performs an angioplasty procedure, but 
finds no effect of cumulative volume11.   Gowrisankaran, Ho, and Town (2006) uses a 
different methodology and finds that three different surgical procedures all exhibit 
positive volume-outcome correlations, though the extent of experience lasting after a 
volume shock varies by how routine the surgery is to perform.  Overall, the literature 
is suggestive of a positive causal relationship between volume and outcomes. 
                                                 
11 Same-stay bypass surgery in addition to angioplasty reflects that the angioplasty failed in clearing 




2.2.5 Consolidation and Quality 
The impact of hospital mergers on quality is theoretically ambiguous.  The 
research discussed above suggests that mergers have the potential to induce 
improvements in quality through strengthening their financial position.  Mergers may 
also improve outcomes through increasing the volume of procedures performed by 
physicians.  On the other hand, if mergers reduce competition sufficiently, there may 
be downward pressures on quality provision.  However, the research on competition 
and quality is more suggestive of association than causation because outside factors 
could be responsible for both competitive markets and better outcomes.  For example, 
urban hospitals face more competition but may also benefit from more resources and 
shorter travel distances for patients.  Therefore, changes in the degree of competition 
a hospital faces may not automatically reduce quality as previous research suggests.  
Ultimately, the impact of hospital mergers on quality of care is an empirical question.  
It is important to note, however, that welfare is not necessarily positively tied to 
quality, particularly if there is supra-optimal provision of quality in the hospital 
market. 
Two papers analyze the impact of hospital mergers on health outcomes.  Ho 
and Hamilton (2000) study the impact of hospital mergers, system acquisitions and 
system transfers of California hospitals between 1991 and 1996.  They find an 
increase in readmission rates for heart attack patients treated in a merged hospital, but 
no statistically significant effect on inpatient mortality for heart attack or stroke 
patients.  However, these coefficients are not precisely estimated.  Their empirical 




three merger and acquisition events, and thus assumes that consolidation has a single 
level effect, rather than one that varies with time.  Considering the likely initial 
upheaval from a merger and the learning curve of working under new leadership or 
running a new facility, this approach may cancel out opposing impacts over time.  
More importantly, by comparing merging to non-merging hospitals, they assume 
patient choice and the behavior of non-merging hospitals do not respond to the 
merger.  Because patients may alter their hospital choices due to perceived changes in 
quality, the composition of patients may differ before and after the event.  And 
because the effects could differ across patients, average changes may mask important 
changes in distribution of outcomes.  In addition, if the resulting reallocation of 
patients results in better (or worse) matching between patients and hospitals, these 
changes would be missed by this type of comparison.  Furthermore, any changes at 
merger hospitals will be masked if there are also changes at non-merging hospitals.  
Previous research has found that non-merging hospitals raise their prices after a 
merger between nearby hospitals (Dafny 2008).  It is plausible that they could 
respond along quality dimensions as well. 
Capps (2005) studies 11 hospital mergers in New York during the years 1995 
to 2000.  He uses the AHRQ quality measures and compares outcomes from merging 
hospitals to two sets of control groups: hospitals that are similar based on observable 
characteristics and those that have similar probabilities of merging as each merging 
hospital.  Capps’ methodology also relies on a hospital level analysis and thus faces 
the same set of concerns as the Ho and Hamilton (2000) paper above.  He does not 




transitory negative impact on two heart attack outcomes using the first control group.  
Gaynor (2006) posits that the lack of significant results from these two papers could 
be either due to mergers not impacting quality or due to the small number of mergers 
studied and thus insufficient power in the analysis. 
My analysis should build on previous research in several ways.  It covers a 
longer time period (1990-2006) and a larger number of mergers (40).  Also, instead of 
controlling for the endogeneity of hospital mergers by using hospital fixed effects (Ho 
and Hamilton 2000) or by constructing a control group of similar hospitals (Capps 
2005), I use an instrumental variables approach based on the varying exposure to a 
merger across zip codes, where exposure to a merged facility is instrumented with 
predicted exposure.  One benefit of this approach is that it captures the average effect 
of the merger across all patients, even if hospital choice and the behavior of non-




The data for this project comes from two sources: an annual hospital financial 
data set and an annual inpatient discharge data set.  Both data sets were obtained from 
California’s Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD).  The 
annual financial data set includes a vast set of information for each hospital in the 
state by fiscal year.  It includes information on the characteristics of hospitals such as 
its owner, profit-type, location, whether it was a teaching or rural hospital, number of 




investment, aggregated patient information on revenue, outpatient visits and inpatient 
days and discharges by pay-type is included as well.  The data set also includes 
information on the type of hospital, such as general acute, psychiatric or specialty.  I 
drop all specialized hospitals and focus my analysis on general acute facilities 
because I will be limiting my analysis to heart disease patients.  While long term care 
facilities might treat patients for heart disease, the treatment is likely to consist of 
rehabilitative care after the patient has been discharged from a general acute facility. 
The annual inpatient discharge data set includes every inpatient discharge 
from a California hospital for each year in the data.  This data set includes patient 
level data on demographic characteristics, payment, diagnosis and procedures 
performed.  Demographic information includes age categories, sex, race, ethnicity, 
county of residence for California residents and 5-digit zip code of residence.  
Payment information includes expected primary source of payment split into 
categories such as Medicare, Medicaid and private payers as well as total charges.  It 
is important to note that total charges do not reflect the actual amount paid by the 
patient or the insurance provider because insurance providers often negotiate rates for 
each procedure and service.  However, changes in average charges could provide 
evidence to support an observed increase or decrease in treatment intensity because 
charges are likely to be correlated with the number and intensity of procedures.  
Diagnostic and procedural information includes principal diagnoses and procedures 
listed as ICD-9-CM codes as well as up to 24 additional diagnoses and 20 additional 
procedures.  There are also variables listing whether each diagnosis was present at 




admission date.  In addition, each discharge record includes the facility number of the 
hospital where the individual was treated as well as the year and quarter of admission 
and length of stay (in days). 
Table 2.1 provides hospital-level financial and discharge statistics for selected 
years.  Most demographic characteristics appear fairly stable over time, though the 
percent of Hispanic patients and the percent of patients who are at least 65 years of 
age rise throughout the time period. In general, length of stay and inpatient mortality 
decline over this time period, while average charges increase.  This could represent an 
increase in list prices as well as an increase in the number or intensity of procedures 
performed.  Both the average number of discharges per hospital and available beds 
per hospital increase over this time period.  Consolidation in the hospital market in 
the form of mergers is at least partly responsible for this trend.  The closure of 
hospitals also contributes to this trend because smaller hospitals are more likely to 
close.  The financial position of hospitals declines for at least the first two-thirds of 
this time period, as evidenced by falling revenue-to-expenditure margins.  These 
figures improve between 2000 and 2005.  It is also interesting to note that nursing 
hours per bed increase across this time period.  This could represent an increase in 
quality of care or an increase in bed utilization. 
One concern with the inpatient discharge data is that, beginning in 2000, 
OSHPD began masking certain variables to prevent the identification of individuals 
within the data set.  For reporting years 2000 to 2006, 3.4 percent of observations 
must be dropped because quarter of admission and/or zip code of residence are 




sometimes masked as well.  The prevalence of masking in these variables is much 
higher, particularly for race and ethnicity. Approximately 15 percent of observations 
from these reporting years have masked values for sex, race and ethnicity.  An 
additional 8 percent have masked values for race and ethnicity, and another 4 percent 
have a masked value for ethnicity only.  As evidenced in Table 2.1, percentages for 
the gender, race and ethnicity categories do not seem to change much upon the year 
2000.  The largest drop is in the percent Black variable, which drops 1.06 percentage 
points from 1999 to 2000, though part of this is likely to come from a slight 
downward trend in this variable beginning in 1995.  It is unlikely that this presents a 
significant problem for the purpose of this analysis. 
Like many of the papers referenced above, I also restrict my analysis sample 
to a specific diagnosis category: patients with heart disease.  This type of restriction 
allows me to construct a reasonable set of outcome variables beyond mortality as well 
as a relevant set of co-morbidity factors to use as control variables.  Limiting my 
analysis to patients with a heart attack (AMI) would be ideal because AMI is an acute 
health event that requires immediate hospitalization, minimalizing chances of 
selection bias in admission decisions.  Unfortunately, there are not enough zip codes 
with a sufficient number of AMI discharges in all quarters.  To remedy this situation, 
I expand the data set to include all individuals with a diagnosis of ischemic heart 
disease (IHD), which includes both acute and chronic forms of heart disease12.  This 
expansion enables me to create a balanced panel of 697 zip codes with at least 15 
                                                 
12 I further restrict the analysis sample to only those IHD discharges with a cardiac major diagnosis 
code; I assume that a non-cardiac admission with IHD includes those for which heart disease is merely 
a complicating factor and those who develop an AMI in response to complications from another 





IHD discharges in all 68 quarters.  Because IHD varies in severity, hospitals may 
have varying decision rules for when to admit a patient with heart disease.  This 
selection issue should not come into play unless a hospital merger induces a change in 
admission criteria.  I demonstrate below that mergers do not appear to impact the 
admission criteria for heart disease patients. 
Table 2.2 includes descriptive statistics for IHD patients and their hospital 
experiences.  Unsurprisingly, this subset of the discharges has a greater percentage of 
men and skews older, resulting in a much higher Medicare coverage percentage.  It is 
interesting to note that the age distribution among the elderly shifts older across the 
time period as well.  These trends suggest that there is less potential for gains from 
merger-related increases in bargaining power with insurance firms for cardiac care, 
because the percent of IHD discharges covered by private insurance falls from 
roughly 30 percent in the early 1990s to just under 23 percent by 2005.  Thus we 
might expect changes on the quality margin to be particularly strong among IHD 
patients.  However, as cited above, Dafny (2005) finds evidence that hospitals 
optimize quality decisions across all services, rather than envisioning each diagnostic 
category as a separate market in which to compete. 
It also appears that while heart disease patients have more complicating 
diagnoses in later years, treatment intensity has increased as well, yielding potential 
improvements in outcomes.  The prevalence of diabetes among heart disease patients 
nearly doubles from 1990 to 2005, as does the incidence of hypertension.  The 
incidence of heart failure increases by over 40 percent as well.  However, the 




20 percent from 1990 to 2005.  In addition, inpatient mortality falls by over 30 
percent during this time period.  However, considering that length of stay falls 
dramatically during this time period as well, this drop in inpatient mortality could be 
confounded by a change in discharge policies if hospitals are more likely over time to 
discharge someone to die at home.  It is also interesting to note that the number of 
hospitals treating heart disease patients falls by over 25 percent while the number of 
heart disease patients treated at a hospital rises by nearly 60 percent.  These trends are 
likely caused by a combination of hospital closures and mergers over the time period. 
 
2.4 Background on California Hospital Mergers 
I use two methods to identify hospital mergers.  Through 2002, the 
documentation for the inpatient discharge data included a list of consolidated 
hospitals.  I checked hospital websites to confirm each of the relevant mergers and to 
determine the fate of each satellite facility, whether it became a specialty facility, 
remained the same, or split specialized services with the parent hospital.  In a few 
instances, the satellite hospital was promptly closed.  I do not count these as mergers 
because the satellite did not continue to operate in any capacity after the merger. 
Because the hospital consolidation lists were not continued beyond 2002, 
another method was necessary to identify mergers in 2003 to 2005.  This was possible 
because a merger looks like a closure in the annual financial data set.  Both involve 
the disappearance of a facility number: a satellite hospital in a merger surrenders its 
facility license in the merge and a closing hospital surrenders its facility number in 




hospital closures published by the California Hospital Association13.  From this 
process, I identified several mergers that transpired after the consolidation lists were 
discontinued.  Table 2.3 provides details on the timing of all California hospital 
mergers during this time period. 
A total of 40 hospital mergers occurred between the years 1990 and 2005.  
Twenty-seven of these mergers involved non-profit hospitals, 10 involved for-profit 
hospitals, and 3 involved county or district hospitals.  In general, especially during the 
1990s, mergers were more likely to take place in greater metropolitan areas, such as 
Los Angeles or San Francisco.  Mergers also tended to involve hospitals that were 
geographically close to one another: 25 mergers were between hospitals that were no 
more than five miles apart.  All but one of the remaining mergers were between 
hospitals no more than 15 miles apart.  The one exception is a merger between two 
district hospitals in northeastern California, where the satellite is a small rural hospital 
that needed to find a merging partner in order to survive.  Nearly one-third of mergers 
involved one of the hospitals being acquired and merged into the other 
simultaneously.  Ten mergers transpired one to five years after one of the two 
merging hospitals was acquired or after a local system was created; six out of these 
were completed three years after the ownership change.  In the remaining mergers, 
both hospitals were owned by the same firm or government entity for more than five 
years or the entire data period14. 
                                                 
13 This report can be found here: 
www.calhealth.org/public/press/Article%5C107%5CHospitalclosures.pdf 
14 There are eight hospital mergers that take place in the first five years of the time period and do not 
change ownership during the time period.  Because I do not have data for years before 1990, I do not 




Parent hospitals are, on average, larger than satellite hospitals when measured 
by bed size, as evidenced by Table 2.4.  Parent hospitals are also, on average, larger 
than non-merging hospitals, even before the merger.  The average bed size of the 
merged hospital is smaller than the sum of the average satellite and parent hospital 
bed sizes because some hospitals do not keep all beds after the merger.  These 
hospitals are likely converting some of the bed space to other uses or closing off some 
of the patient rooms.  As one would expect from the size comparisons, parent 
hospitals are also more likely than non-merging hospitals to have specialty services 
such as NICUs and open heart surgery services as well as diagnostic tools such as 
MRI machines.  Satellite hospitals are less likely to have these services and tools than 
non-merging hospitals.  It is interesting to note that in many cases, the percent of 
merged hospitals with a particular specialty service does not increase much from the 
percent of parent hospitals, even when a reasonably large percentage of satellite 
facilities have the service.  For example, 78.4 percent of parent hospitals and 51.4 
percent of satellite hospitals house neurological surgical services in the year before a 
merger.  However, only 83.8 percent of merged hospitals house this specialty.  This 
pattern suggests that hospitals are not merging for the purpose of expanding service 
capabilities, but instead to potentially cut costs by reducing overlapped service 
provision. 
The importance of a merger in terms of the number or share of people 
impacted varies across mergers.  For example, the Eden Medical Center/San Leandro 
Hospital merger in 2004 had little impact on market concentration for heart disease 




facilities.  Both hospitals had market shares above 10 percent in a few zip codes, but 
in most cases the market share of one was far less than half the market share of the 
other.  The greatest change in HHI was from 0.12 to 0.20.  The St. Joseph Hospital-
Eureka/General Hospital of Eureka merger in 2000, however, had a much larger 
impact on market concentration in the surrounding area.  Several zip codes 
experience an increase in HHI of over 0.15, resulting in HHIs as high as 0.88 and 
market shares as high as 94 percent.  Other mergers fall in between these two 
examples in their impacts on merged market shares and increases in market 
concentration. 
Table 2.5 reports pre-post statistics on the characteristics of heart disease 
admissions in merged facilities.  There are three noteworthy observations.  Average 
charges increase more rapidly after a merger as compared to before.  Considering that 
length of stay remains fairly constant and number of procedures steadily increases, 
this increase in charges likely comes from a combination of increase in treatment 
intensity as well as an increase in list prices for cardiac hospital services15.  Similarly, 
the percentage of patients receiving intensive procedures rises considerably after a 
merger.  This trend is particularly notable because this percentage is fairly stable in 
the year before the merger.  However, there is an overall upward trend in usage of 
intensive procedures across all patients and time periods, and the relative impact of 
mergers and trends cannot be teased out without an adequate comparison group.  In 
addition, the percent of patients with hypertension and diabetes appears to increase 
after a merger.  While the other co-morbidity rates are too noisy to discern whether 
                                                 
15 Recall that list prices are not a proxy for actual transactions prices; even if this increase in charges 
stems solely from an increase in list prices, it is not necessarily true that hospitals received higher 




there is a break in trend, there is suggestive evidence of a change in the average 
sickness of patients in merged hospitals which could also contribute to apparent 
changes in treatment intensity. 
 
2.5 Empirical Framework and Results 
It is difficult to identify the causal impact of a merger at the hospital level 
because patients may reallocate themselves across hospitals in response to a merger.  
This would lead to shifts in patient composition that could confound the identification 
of outcome or treatment changes.  Reallocation could stem from two potential 
sources.  One source is fairly innocuous and originates from people preferring 
hospitals that are close by.  If a satellite hospital is transformed into a specialty 
facility, then some patients may choose a non-merging hospital after a merger if it is 
closer than the parent facility.  The other motivation for reallocation presents a larger 
concern.  If a hospital merger causes a change in public perception of the merged 
facility’s quality, then reallocation could result in a differential change in the health 
distribution of patients admitted to the merged facility.  Sicker patients are thought to 
be more likely to travel further for higher quality care, so if a merged facility is 
perceived to improve quality, the average patient after the merger might be sicker.  
Likewise, if common perception is that quality declined due to the merger, the 
average patient might be healthier because local sicker patients choose to travel 
further to an alternate hospital.  While the first scenario may be less likely to bias 
hospital level analysis, the latter two possibilities have a strong likelihood to bias 




Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the variation in response to a hospital merger.  
Lighter gray zip codes represent drops in merged facility market share for heart 
disease patients one year after the merger.  Darker gray zip codes represent increases 
in share, with black representing larger increases.  Some mergers result in widespread 
decline in merged market share, as in Figure 2.2, which represents the Eden Medical 
Center and San Leandro Hospital merger from 2004.  This drop in market share is 
especially visible in zip codes nearby Eden Medical Center, the parent facility.  Other 
mergers result in a more varied response.  Figure 2.3 depicts the impact of the Fresno 
Community Hospital and Valley Medical Center merger in 1999.  In this case, 
merged market share falls in some zip codes, yet rises a great deal in others.  It is 
unlikely that this variation is entirely random, which suggests that a hospital level 
analysis could be biased by differential changes in hospital choices by patients. 
For this reason, it is necessary to analyze outcomes within population groups 
that are unlikely to change in response to a merger, such as geographic areas.  
Previous hospital merger research has either used geographic areas such as counties 
or health service areas (HSAs) or incorporated overlapping fixed radius market 
definitions.  Both of these methods have drawbacks.  HSAs and even counties are 
large enough that individuals on opposite ends of the market face a different set of 
likely hospital choices.  In addition, individuals near the border of a market may be 
closer to a hospital outside of their county or HSA.  Fixed radius definitions are 
difficult to establish because hospitals of different sizes and with different service 




somewhat arbitrary decision of how far an individual is likely to travel to use a 
particular hospital. 
I avoid these issues by utilizing a zip code-level analysis.  Zip codes are fairly 
small, and thus all individuals within a single zip code are likely to face a similar set 
of relevant hospital choices.  Utilizing zip codes also does not require any 
assumptions to be made over how far a particular hospital’s reach is.  Instead, I let 
patient choices dictate where merged hospitals are relevant. The share of patients 
within a zip code discharged from a merged facility is used to measure exposure to a 
merger.  This methodology enables me to exploit the heterogeneity of exposure to a 
merger to measure its effect.  If a merged facility changes its quality level or 
treatment practices, we would expect these changes to have a larger impact on a zip 
code with 40 percent of its discharges from the merged facility than on a zip code 
with 2 percent of discharges from the merged facility.  In addition, individuals are 
unlikely to relocate their residence in response to a hospital merger, especially as 
compared to the likelihood of utilizing a different hospital.  This allows me to 
compare pre- and post-merger outcomes for plausibly similar populations. 
Another benefit of utilizing a zip code based analysis is that it includes all 
patients, whether or not they were discharged from a merged facility.  Estimating the 
effect across an entire zip code includes not only the direct effect on patients using 
the merged facility but also the ripple effects of the merger.  These include any 
changes in hospital choice decisions by patients as well as any changes made by 
hospitals in response to changes in the competitive landscape.  While it will not be 




from the indirect effects of patient reallocation and non-merging hospital changes, 
this empirical methodology enables an analysis of how all patients were affected by 
the merger. 
Relying entirely on merged market shares is insufficient for measuring the 
impact of a merger.  This approach would be subject to the same potential selection 
bias as the hospital-level approach.  I use a solution that is similar to the one used by 
Town, et al (2006).  They bypass the issue of hospital choice by assigning market 
shares from 1990 to hospitals in the following years so that the only changes in 
market shares come from hospital mergers.  As a result, any hospitals that open after 
1990 are left out of their analysis.  In addition, some information may be lost by 
relying on shares from 1990.  This may be less of an issue for their analysis because 
they are analyzing market share in terms of staffed beds rather than number of 
discharges, and staffed bed levels may change less over time.  I modify their approach 
by using shares of discharges from one year before the merger to predict shares of 
discharges in quarters following the merger16.  Pre-merge parent and satellite market 
shares are used to create a predicted merged facility share.  Thus, the IV estimations 
will only use the variation in post-merge shares that comes from the expected impact 
of the merger ex-ante, alleviating the selection bias concern. 
As described above, the baseline model in OLS is:  
ztztzttzzt postIshareXy 111111 )(*     (1) 
The relationship between the explanatory variable and its instrument can be modeled 
as: 
                                                 
16 Shares from one year before the merger are used in case facility changes are made in anticipation of 
the merger.  The earliest possible quarter is used for the four mergers that transpire less than one year 




ztztzttzzt postIsharepreXpostIshare 222222 )(*_ )(*    (2) 
In the above models, share*I(post)zt is the zip code-level share of patients discharged 
from merged hospital in all zip codes and quarters of admission.  It equals zero before 
a merger takes place and in any zip codes unaffected by a merger.  In a zip code 
affected by more than one merger, share*I(post)zt equals the sum of the shares of 
patients in each of the merged facilities.  The instrument, pre_share*I(post)zt, is the 
predicted merged share of discharges described above.  It is calculated by adding 
together the parent and satellite shares of discharges from one year before the merger.  
In zip codes affected by one merger only, this variable equals zero in all quarters 
leading up to the merger, and equals the pre-merger share in all quarters following the 
merger.  In zip codes affected by more than one merger, pre_share*I(post)zt, 
increases by the pre-share values of subsequent mergers after they are completed17. 
The outcome variables, represented by zty , are percent of patients receiving 
intensive procedures (defined as bypass surgery or angioplasty), percent of patients 
receiving their primary treatment within one day, average number of procedures, log 
of average charges, inpatient mortality, and average length of stay.  Hospital mergers 
have the potential to increase the usage of intensive heart surgeries because only two 
mergers combined facilities that had both offered these procedures before the merger.  
Sixteen of the parent hospitals and four of the satellites had this capability.  For the 
sixteen merged facilities in which only one of the facilities offered intensive heart 
surgery capabilities, individuals who would have used the other hospital 
automatically have increased access to these procedures.  One might expect that the 
                                                 
17 These share variables are based on heart disease diagnoses.  Using shares of all discharges yields 




incidence of their usage would increase with their availability.  While it is reasonable 
to expect that a patient would be more likely to choose a hospital with these 
capabilities when she expects or plans to use them, it is conceivable that distance to 
the hospital may be a greater priority.  There is also the possibility of induced 
demand: that increased availability increases the likelihood of utilization because it is 
now more convenient.   
Number of procedures can be interpreted as another measure of treatment 
intensity.  The percent of patients receiving treatment within one day is a potential 
measure of quality of care.  Delays in treatment could reflect overcrowding or 
physician understaffing.  Delays could also come from treatment by less experienced 
or less qualified physicians.18  The control variables, represented by ztX , include 
demographic variables for characteristics including average age and the percentage of 
zip code discharges in categories for race and gender, insurance-status, and co-
morbidity diagnoses including diabetes, heart failure, and pneumonia.  z  and t  
represent zip code and year-quarter fixed effects, respectively. 
The above model is identified on four main assumptions.  First, while mergers 
are endogenous in terms of which hospitals merge and the merging partners chosen, 
their timing is not.  Completing a merger involves a complex negotiation process as it 
requires developing a singular hospital board and unifying two medical staffs.  As 
such, it is difficult to predict when a merger will be finalized, regardless of when the 
negotiations begin.  Second, the composition of patients residing within a zip code 
                                                 
18 Doyle, Ewer, and Wagner (2008) find that teams of residents from a lower ranked medical school 
take more time to diagnose patients in a VA hospital than teams from a highly ranked medical school 




does not change because of the merger.  While individuals may base moving 
decisions on available hospitals and their quality, this is unlikely to happen in 
response to a merger and is unlikely to represent a significant percent of any zip 
code’s population in the future.  The third identifying assumption is that pre-merge 
shares of discharges are not impacted by the impending merger. 
The fourth assumption is that merging hospitals do not change their admission 
criteria for heart disease patients.  I test this assumption by regressing the percent of 
AMI admissions on pre-merge shares, including zip code specific time trends to 
control for how zip code populations may be changing over time.  The coefficient of 
0.002 with a standard error of 0.007 suggests that heart attack admissions as a percent 
of heart disease admissions did not change.  This in turn suggests that the average 
sickness of patients admitted is not correlated with exposure to a merger and that 
admission practices at merged facilities did not change post-merger19. 
Table 2.6 reports the results from estimation of the first stage relationship 
described by equation (2) above.  As reported in columns (1) and (2), the coefficient 
on pre_sharezt is precisely estimated as 0.84.  The F statistics are well above 10, 
suggesting a strong first stage relationship.  Columns (3) and (4) report the results of a 
similar estimation in which the pre-merger shares are interacted with 5 timing 
variables.  Each of these timing variables is turned on for a different period following 
the merger: one each for the first four years after the merger transpires, and one that is 
turned on during and after the fifth post-merger year.  The coefficients on the timing-
interacted pre-merger share variables suggest that the relationship between pre- and 
                                                 
19 Conducting the same test with other demographic characteristics and measures of illness severity 





post-merger shares is not unique to the initial quarters or years after a merger.  
Merged facilities retain most of their market share even five years after the merger 
transpires, though there is a small decline in later years.  Columns (5) - (8) report 
results of estimations similar to columns (1) – (4) with the addition of zip code 
specific time trends.  Both the magnitude and statistical significance of the 
coefficients are similar between the two sets of columns.   
Table 2.7 reports the OLS regression results for each of the six dependent 
variables listed above.  The top panel reports the results from specifications without 
zip code time trends, and the bottom panel reports the results from specifications that 
include zip code time trends.  The results listed in columns (1) – (2) for both panels 
suggest that merged hospitals increase usage of intensive heart surgeries.  The 
coefficient of 0.043 in column (2) of the top panel suggests that a zip code with 20 
percent of its heart disease discharges coming from a merged hospital will experience 
an increase in intensive surgeries of 0.86 percentage points.  Considering that in 2000, 
23.7 percent of heart disease patients received intensive heart surgeries, this point 
estimate represents a 3.6 percent increase.  Zip codes with larger percentages of 
discharges from a merged facility will be impacted proportionally to their share.  
Given that the usage of heart surgeries is increasing over this time period, we may be 
concerned that this estimate is driven by this upward trend.  The coefficient of 0.030 
in the second panel of Table 2.7 suggests that merged hospitals increase the 
utilization of intensive surgeries in addition to the upward trend.  This coefficient 
translates into a 2.5 percent increase in intensive surgery utilization for the 




The next four columns in Table 2.7 list the coefficients for the percent of 
patients receiving their primary treatment within one day and the average number of 
procedures performed on an individual.  In the first panel, both of these outcomes 
appear to be significantly impacted by hospital mergers.  The coefficients of 0.075 for 
treatment within one day and 0.444 for number of procedures each translate to a 3.2 
percent increase above 2000 averages for the benchmark zip code.  However, when 
time trends are added, both coefficients become economically and statistically 
insignificant.  Log of average charges, which is listed in the columns (7) – (8), does 
not appear to be impacted by hospital mergers, regardless of whether time trends are 
included. 
The final two outcomes, inpatient mortality and average length of stay, are 
listed in the last four columns of the table.  These outcomes are discussed together 
because it is possible for hospital discharge practices to impact inpatient mortality 
rates.  If we see a decrease in average length of stay coupled with a decrease in 
inpatient mortality, then we may be skeptical of the mortality result.  In this case, 
however, it appears that inpatient mortality may increase after a merger, whereas 
average length of stay appears to fall once time trends are included.  The implied 
impact on inpatient mortality rates is also larger than the impact on average length of 
stay.  For the benchmark zip code, inpatient mortality may increase by 1.1 to 1.6 
percent from its 2000 average, though the estimates are not precise.  Average length 





As described above, OLS results may be biased if individuals change their 
hospital choices in response to a perceived quality change from a merger.  Table 2.8 
reports the same results as Table 2.7 for the IV specification.  In general, the IV 
specification suggests a larger impact on treatment intensity.  For example, the 
estimated impact of mergers on utilization of intensive treatment rises to 2.9 percent 
for the benchmark zip code even after time trends are included.  The coefficients for 
treatment within one day and average number of procedures are larger as well, though 
they still shrink to economic and statistical insignificance when time trends are 
included.  The impact on log of average charges remains small and statistically 
insignificant regardless of time trend inclusion. 
The most striking change between the OLS and IV specification is the 
estimated impact on inpatient mortality.  The coefficient on merged market share 
increases to 0.003 without time trends and to 0.005 with time trends.  Both 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level.  For the 
benchmark zip code, these point estimates suggest an increase in inpatient mortality 
of 1.6 percent and 2.7 percent, respectively.  The small and statistically insignificant 
coefficients for the average length of stay outcome suggest that the impact on 
inpatient mortality is not driven by changes in discharge practices.  It is perhaps 
surprising that inpatient mortality rises despite the increase in treatment intensity 
described above.  I provide a potential explanation for this result below. 
Given the average post-merger results described above, we may question 
whether these effects are driven by transitory changes after a merger or long-term 




time.  As demonstrated earlier, OLS estimates are subject to some selection bias.  
This bias was particularly apparent in the inpatient mortality specifications.  To 
bypass this potential source of bias, I use the instrument, pre-merge share, for this set 
of specifications instead of actual market share.  Pre-merge share is interacted with 
the same set of timing dummy variables as in the first stage specifications, with the 
addition of an indicator for quarters within one year before a merger for a particular 
zip code.  This addition is included to confirm that mergers did not have an impact on 
patient experiences before the merger transpired. 
The first observation to note from this table is that, with two exceptions, 
mergers do not impact patients before the merger has transpired.  The first exception 
is the treatment within one day specifications in the first panel.  As was already noted, 
the results for this measure of treatment intensity are part of an increasing trend.  The 
inclusion of time trends results in a large reduction in magnitude for all of the timing-
interacted pre-merge share variables.  In addition, these coefficients are no longer 
statistically significant at any level once time trends are included.  The second 
exception is the average length of stay outcome once time trends are included.  The 
pre-merge interaction variable has a coefficient that is both more negative and more 
precisely estimated than any of the post-merger interaction terms.  This negative 
coefficient could come from adjustments just before the merger considering that 
length of stay is determined by the endpoint of the admission.  In addition, while this 
coefficient is statistically significant, it only represents a 1 percent decrease in length 
of stay for the benchmark zip code from the 2000 average.  Considering that most 




this represents an even smaller change in most cases, plausibly coming from 
discharges at the end of the quarter.  Thus we shouldn’t be concerned about changes 
happening in anticipation of a merger. 
The second observation is that the results from Tables 2.7 and 2.8 are not 
driven by transitory changes.  Instead, most effects grow with time following a 
merger.  For example, when time trends are included, the increase in percentage of 
patients receiving intensive treatments rises from 2.7 percent in the first year after a 
merger to 3.5 percent in the fourth year after a merger for the zip code described 
above.  The increases in inpatient mortality follow a similar trend.  In addition, the 
number of procedures appears to increase with time after a merger, even when time 
trends are included.  In later years, these coefficients are statistically significant and 
translate to increases of 2.4 percent or more from a base of 2.8 procedures for the 
benchmark zip code. 
 
2.6 Alternate Specifications 
The main specification described in section five does not differentiate between 
zip codes primarily exposed to a merger from the parent from those primarily 
exposed through the satellite.  As demonstrated in Table 2.4, parent and satellite 
facilities differ in several ways.  Thus, their patients may be differentially impacted.  
The main specification also does not analyze whether mergers that have a large effect 
on market concentration differ from those that do not.  Given the findings of the 




to have different effects that those with less.  This section will explore these two 
questions. 
2.6.1 The Differential Effect of Satellite Facilities 
The changes experienced by parent and satellite hospitals are usually 
different.  As described above, there is often some degree of service consolidation 
that comes with a merger.  In these cases, the parent facility is more likely to retain 
the cardiac service specialty.  Thus, we may expect patients who would have used the 
satellite in the absence of the merger to be differentially impacted compared to those 
who would have used the parent facility.  The specification reported below explores 
this possibility. 
Because all discharges for a merged facility are attributed to the merged 
facility license, Tables 2.7 and 2.8 cannot be replicated with market shares split into 
parent and satellite shares.  I use a reduced form specification with the addition of 
pre-merge satellite shares to investigate how patients are differentially impacted by 
exposure through the satellite.  Table 2.10 reports these results.  Three observations 
stand out.  First, the impact of a merger on the utilization of intensive treatments is 
not driven solely by exposure through the satellite facility.  We might expect this 
increase to be particularly prominent for satellite patients because these individuals 
are more likely to experience an increase in access to intensive procedures.  Even 
with the inclusion of time trends, the coefficient on pre-merger share is positive and 
statistically significant, while the coefficient on satellite share is insignificant.  Thus, 
exposure through the satellite does not appear to drive the increase in treatment 




is not merely a mechanical effect from an increase in access for satellite patients.  
Instead, hospital mergers appear to increase the propensity for prescribing these 
procedures for all patients.   
The second notable observation is that the average number of procedures 
appears to increase for satellite patients, even with the inclusion of time trends.  The 
coefficient of 0.372 translates into a 1.4 percent increase in number of procedures 
from the 2000 average of 2.8 procedures for a zip code with a 10 percent pre-merge 
share in the satellite facility.  The third, and possibly most important, observation is 
that the increase in inpatient mortality is potentially drive by exposure through the 
satellite facility.  Without time trends, the coefficient on pre-merge share is roughly 
zero while the coefficient on satellite share is a precisely estimated 0.012.  When time 
trends are included, neither coefficient is statistically significant, though the satellite 
share coefficient is over twice that on overall pre-merge shares.  This effect could be 
driven by an increase in the average travel time and distance to care for satellite 
patients.  Exposure through the satellite may be larger when the two facilities are 
further apart, increasing the impact on inpatient mortality.  This interpretation is 
consistent with Buchmueller, et al (2006), which found that urban hospital closures in 
Los Angeles were associated with increases in distance to care that resulted in 
increased mortality from heart attacks and unintentional injuries. 
2.6.2 The Effect of Increased Competition 
Much of the concern with hospital mergers stems from their impact on market 
concentration.  Thus far my analysis has not differentiated between mergers that have 




The effect on market concentration varies across mergers, as evidenced by a 
comparison of Figures 2.4 and 2.5.  Figure 2.4 is a map of the zip codes surrounding 
Fresno Community Hospital and Valley Medical Center in Fresno County.  Zip codes 
are shaded based on the predicted change in HHI from the merger of the two 










As above, parent and satellite shares are measured one year before the merger 
transpires.  Thus, predicted_dHHI predicts the impact of a merger on market 
concentration absent any changes in market shares beyond those that stem directly 
from the merger.   
Figure 2.4 shows that there were several zip codes with large potential 
changes in market concentration from the merger of Fresno Community Hospital and 
Valley Medical Center.  This is unsurprising because the two facilities are only 2 
miles apart.  Other mergers had a minimal impact on local market concentration.  One 
example is shown in Figure 2.5.  Saddleback Memorial Center and San Clemente 
Hospital are located 14 miles apart, and thus have much lower overlap in shares of 
patients.  In this case, there is a much smaller potential impact on market 
concentration.  It is plausible that the impact of a merger would vary with its impact 
on concentration, particularly given the findings from the literature on the correlation 
between concentration and quality of care. 
To investigate how the impact of a merger changes with its effect on market 
concentration, I estimate a regression similar to (1) above, with the addition of HHI.  




differences across hospitals.  To bypass this issue, I use the predicted change in HHI 
measure described above to instrument for HHI.  Table 2.11 reports the first stage 
results for post-merger market share and HHI and their instruments.  The relationship 
between parent and satellite shares and post-merger market share and the relationship 
between predicted change in HHI and HHI are robust to both the inclusion of control 
variables and of time trends.  F-statistics are above 10 in all cases.  The time 
interacted results are not included here, though they follow a similar trend to the time-
interacted first stage results described above. 
The IV specification results are reported in Table 2.12.  In general, these 
results suggest that mergers may have a stronger effect on treatment intensity when 
they have a larger impact on market concentration.  For example, the coefficient on 
HHI for utilization of intensive treatments is 0.128 when time trends are excluded and 
0.141 when they are included.  The percentage of patients who receive their primary 
treatment within one day is also affected by a merger’s impact on HHI, though only 
the coefficient in the second panel is statistically significant, and then only at the 10 
percent significance level.  While not precisely estimated, the coefficient on HHI for 
inpatient mortality is fairly large and negative both with and without time trends.  
Considering that the increase in inpatient mortality may be driven by an increase in 
average travel time to a hospital, it is perhaps unsurprising that this coefficient would 
be negative.  Mergers that have a large effect on HHI are likely to involve facilities 
that are geographically close to each other, thus alleviating the travel time issue.  It is 
possible that the concentration-induced increases in treatment intensity described 




merging pair of hospitals is closer to each other, they may be more likely to retain 
patients from both facilities regardless of the extent of service consolidation.  Thus 




The results detailed above suggest that hospital mergers both increase 
utilization of intensive treatments and increase the incidence of inpatient mortality.  
Increases in treatment intensity through other measures, such as receiving treatment 
within one day or number of procedures are possible, though these results are not 
robust to the inclusion of zip code specific time trends.  Patients who are exposed 
through the satellite facility appear to be most affected by a merger, both in their 
utilization of intensive heart surgeries and in their incidence of inpatient mortality.  
These patients also experience an increase in the number of procedures received 
during a hospital stay that is robust to the inclusion of time trends.  It should be noted, 
though, that the increase in usage of intensive heart surgeries is experienced by 
patients exposed to a merger through the parent as well.  This suggests that increases 
in heart surgeries are not solely originating from an increase in access; merged 
facilities are increasing their provision of these surgeries across the board. 
These results differ from those found in both Ho and Hamilton (2000) and Capps 
(2005) in that I find statistically significant and robust increases in inpatient mortality 
for heart disease patients.  This difference may be driven by the fact that I study a 




of my study.  However, the difference may also be driven by capturing the effects 
across all patients, including those who changed hospitals in response to the merger 
and those treated at hospitals whose behavior responded to the merger.  The 
difference in mortality results between the OLS and IV specifications suggests that 
not accounting for patient composition may have biased the results in previous 
literature. 
It is difficult to discern from the results listed above whether the increases in 
treatment intensity are welfare enhancing or reducing.  An increase in the provision of 
bypass surgery and angioplasty may improve the length or quality of life for the 
individuals who would not have otherwise received these treatments.  The volume-
outcome literature suggests that increases in the number of these surgeries performed 
yields improved outcomes as well.  However, any improvements must be weighed 
against the additional cost of providing the treatments.  In addition, previous research 
has found that regions prone to more intensive treatment do not achieve improved 
outcomes.  In fact, outcomes among heart attack patients were found to be worse in 
these regions (Fisher, et al 2003).  Access to readmission rates and 30-day mortality 
rates may shed light on this question, though it would remain difficult to accurately 
assess improvements in quality of life against their costs.  This question requires 
further investigation. 
1990 1995 2000 2005
Patient Characteristics:
     % Male 39.8% 39.9% 39.0% 39.5%
     % Black 8.6% 8.8% 7.5% 7.1%
     % Hispanic 22.5% 25.7% 27.0% 29.8%
     % Aged 65+ 25.9% 29.5% 31.2% 30.2%
     % Medicare 24.8% 28.2% 31.5% 31.9%
     % Medicaid 22.3% 27.1% 23.1% 25.8%
     % Die 2.5% 2.4% 2.3% 2.2%
     Average Length of Stay 5.43 4.86 4.55 4.55
     Average Charges 9134 13706 22568 36684
Hospital Characteristics:
     Average # Discharges 7559 7761 8560 9597
     Operating Revenue/Expenditures 1.23 1.03 1.00 1.02
     Revenue/Expenditures 1.28 1.07 1.04 1.06
     Available Beds 190 188 197 212
     Registered Nurse Hrs/Beds 1440 1533 1810 2205
     Lic. Vocational Nurse Hrs/Beds 243 224 230 238
     # For-Profit 125 115 109 91
     # Government 96 87 69 68
     # Non-Profit 234 238 228 208
Total # Hospitals 455 440 406 367
Table 2.1: Financial and Discharge Statistics for Selected Years
* Financial statistics are weighted by available beds; discharge statistics are weighted by 
number of discharges.
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Year 1990 1995 2000 2005
% With the Following Demographic Characteristics:
     Male 58.2% 58.4% 57.2% 58.4%
     Black 6.6% 6.7% 6.5% 7.2%
     Hisp 9.0% 11.4% 11.5% 14.5%
     Aged 60-74 43.6% 41.7% 36.9% 35.1%
     Aged 75+ 31.1% 34.7% 40.8% 41.6%
% With the Following Expected Payer:
     Medicare 57.2% 58.3% 61.7% 62.9%
     Private 30.5% 28.9% 25.8% 22.9%
# procedures 2.9 2.8 2.8 3.0
Length of Stay (days) 6.2 5.1 4.6 4.4
Charges (1990$) 17395 21810 32301 44430
Received Bypass Surgery or Angioplasty 22.4% 25.8% 27.3% 27.9%
% Treat Within 1 Day 53.8% 52.7% 47.3% 47.9%
% With the Following Co-morbidity Diagnoses:
     Heart Attack 25.5% 25.9% 26.4% 24.2%
     Diabetes 21.2% 27.0% 32.8% 38.4%
     Heart Failure 25.8% 31.2% 32.6% 36.8%
     Hypertension 34.2% 49.4% 60.3% 72.0%
% With the Following Admission & Discharge Characteristics:
     Admitted from (own) ER 55.2% 53.6% 59.3% 61.6%
     Discharged Home 73.0% 68.5% 67.1% 67.1%
     Die 4.6% 4.0% 3.7% 3.2%
Average # Ischemic Discharges (unweighted) 508 588 695 713
# Hospitals 461 448 408 382
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for All Ischemic Heart Disease Diagnoses for Selected Years
* All averages are weighted by number of discharges unless otherwise specified
*** Note that the number of hospitals may from the discharge data set may be larger than the number of 
hospitals from the financial data set for two reasons.  Some satellite hospitals continue to have 
observations after a merger.  In addition, discharge data is based on calendar year rather than fiscal year, 
so that if a hospital closes in fiscal year X, it may still appear in the discharge data for calendar year X+1.
** The data sample includes all discharges with a major diagnostic category of "circulatory system, 
diseases & disorders" (5) and any diagnostic code of "Ischemic Heart Disease" (ICD-9 codes 410-414) in 
relevant hospitals.
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1990 74 4 4 381
1991 73 1 5 380
1992 71 2 7 381
1993 69 2 9 381
1994 66 3 12 379
1995 64 2 14 376
1996 59 5 19 380
1997 55 4 23 375
1998 53 2 25 368
1999 50 3 28 361
2000 47 3 31 359
2001 45 2 33 355
2002 44 1 34 354
2003 40 2 36 352
2004 37 3 39 346
2005 35 1 40 332
Table 2.3: Timing of Mergers
* Numbers of hospitals and mergers are as of the end of the calendar year.
** 2 merged hospitals closed during 2003 and one closed at the end of 
2004; two parent hospitals were involved in two mergers each.
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Parent Hospital        
Year Before Merge
Satellite Hospital       
Year Before Merge





     Licensed 264 168 397 207
     Available 232 145 339 185
Delivery Room 78.4% 48.6% 91.9% 54.6%
NICU 51.4% 27.0% 64.9% 29.1%
Surgery Services:
     Neurological 78.4% 54.1% 83.8% 44.8%
     Heart 33.3% 13.9% 41.7% 28.1%
     Open Heart 32.4% 8.1% 37.8% 22.6%
     Organ Transplant 13.5% 10.8% 21.6% 7.9%
MRI 54.1% 43.2% 67.6% 37.7%
Emergency Room 89.2% 81.1% 91.9% 65.6%
Table 2.4: Comparing Merging and Non-Merging Hospitals - An Overview
* Note that 3 mergers are excluded because pre-merger data was unavailable for the satellite facility.
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Quarter With Respect to Merge -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
# procedures 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0
Length of Stay (days) 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.6
Charges ($) 30965 32890 32801 32756 34623 35661 36757 37174 37704 39246 41449
Received Bypass Surgery or Angioplasty 23.2% 23.1% 23.4% 22.9% 24.6% 24.5% 26.4% 26.9% 26.7% 27.8% 28.0%
% Treat Within 1 Day 46.9% 47.4% 48.4% 48.8% 47.5% 47.9% 48.7% 50.2% 50.5% 49.6% 50.0%
% With the Following Co-morbidity Diagnoses:
     Heart Attack 24.4% 25.1% 26.3% 24.6% 25.0% 25.4% 25.7% 24.7% 25.1% 25.3% 24.4%
     Diabetes 29.7% 31.3% 31.3% 30.9% 32.5% 31.6% 32.0% 32.1% 32.0% 32.5% 33.0%
     Heart Failure 33.6% 34.2% 34.4% 33.2% 33.6% 34.0% 35.7% 32.8% 33.6% 34.9% 34.1%
     Hypertension 56.0% 56.2% 56.9% 57.1% 57.5% 57.2% 59.3% 58.7% 59.8% 60.4% 59.7%
% With the Following Admission & Discharge Characteristics:
     Admitted from (own) ER 57.6% 58.8% 58.0% 57.9% 58.4% 58.8% 59.1% 59.4% 60.2% 58.3% 59.1%
     Discharged Home 68.3% 67.5% 67.1% 68.0% 68.3% 68.2% 68.5% 68.5% 69.5% 69.4% 69.8%
     Die 3.8% 4.3% 4.2% 3.9% 3.8% 4.0% 3.9% 3.4% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7%
Average # Ischemic Discharges (unweighted) 152 155 158 155 146 274 277 278 276 279 280
# Hospitals 68 67 67 67 67 36 36 36 36 35 36
Table 2.5: Pre/Post Merger Statistics for Ischemic Heart Disease Diagnoses
* All averages are weighted by number of discharges unless otherwise specified
** The data sample includes all discharges with a major diagnostic category of "circulatory system, diseases & disorders" (5) and any diagnostic code of "Ischemic Heart Disease" (ICD-9 codes 
410-414) in relevant hospitas.
*** Only mergers/hospitals with all 13 quarters of data available are included.  One satellite hospital stops serving heart disease patients three quarters before its merger.  Another merged 
facility has no discharges in the fifth quarter after its merger, then begins operating again.
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Pre-Merge Share 0.839 0.838 0.887 0.886
(0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)***
Pre-Merge Share * Year 1 (post) 0.823 0.822 0.828 0.828
(0.022)*** (0.021)*** (0.024)*** (0.024)***
Pre-Merge Share * Year 2 (post) 0.807 0.805 0.813 0.813
(0.023)*** (0.022)*** (0.026)*** (0.025)***
Pre-Merge Share * Year 3 (post) 0.817 0.815 0.827 0.827
(0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)***
Pre-Merge Share * Year 4 (post) 0.807 0.806 0.823 0.823
(0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)***
Pre-Merge Share * Year 5+ (post) 0.794 0.793 0.809 0.809
(0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)***
Constant 0 0.02 0 0.022 -0.002 0.011 -0.002 0.012
(0.002) (0.036) (0.002) (0.038) (0.001)** (0.021) (0.001)** (0.022)
Observations 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94
F statistic for instrument(s) 1663.04 1711.85 335.38 340.41 1796.74 1838.27 261.93 340.41
Control Variables N Y N Y N Y N Y
Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Zip Code Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2.6: First Stage Relationship between Share*(Post) and Pre-Merge Share
without zip trends with zip trends
Zip codes are only included if they have 15 or more discharges in every quarter.  All regressions are weighted by the number of heart disease 
discharges.  Standard errors are clustered by zip code.  Control variables include the percent of discharges with demographic characteristics such 
as race, gender, and age categories; with expected payer such as Medicare and private insurance; with co-morbidities such as hypertension, 
diabetes, and heart failure; and admission through the ER.
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Share*(Post) 0.048 0.043 0.084 0.075 0.522 0.444 -0.004 -0.030 0.005 0.002 0.230 0.150
(0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.122)*** (0.122)*** (0.029) (0.029) (0.001)*** (0.001)* (0.145) (0.138)
Constant 0.216 0.270 0.524 0.628 2.893 2.987 9.696 9.680 0.049 0.000 6.323 4.319
(0.002)*** (0.029)*** (0.004)*** (0.056)*** (0.025)*** (0.307)*** (0.008)*** (0.112)*** (0.001)*** (0.012) (0.081)*** (0.620)***
Observations 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396
R-squared 0.6 0.68 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.86 0.87 0.11 0.16 0.69 0.69
With Zip Code-Specific Time Trends:
Share*(Post) 0.035 0.030 0.005 0.003 0.027 0.018 -0.022 -0.021 0.003 0.003 -0.223 -0.183
(0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.015) (0.014) (0.104) (0.101) (0.021) (0.020) (0.002) (0.002) (0.107)** (0.103)*
Constant 0.217 0.272 0.523 0.663 2.889 3.025 9.699 9.717 0.050 -0.001 6.313 4.188
(0.002)*** (0.027)*** (0.003)*** (0.045)*** (0.020)*** (0.262)*** (0.008)*** (0.107)*** (0.001)*** (0.012) (0.081)*** (0.605)***
Observations 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396
R-squared 0.65 0.72 0.61 0.64 0.61 0.64 0.88 0.89 0.13 0.18 0.72 0.73
Control Variables N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Zip Code Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
% Die
Average Length        
of Stay
Zip codes are only included if they have 15 or more discharges in every quarter.  All regressions are weighted by the number of heart disease discharges.  Standard errors are clustered 
by zip code.  Control variables include the percent of discharges with demographic characteristics such as race, gender, and age categories; with expected payer such as Medicare and 
private insurance; with co-morbidities such as hypertension, diabetes, and heart failure; and admission through the ER.
% Intensive       
Treatment
% Treated Within       
One Day
Average #             
Procedures
Log Average           
Charges
% Die
Average Length        
of Stay
Table 2.7: OLS Regression Results
% Intensive       
Treatment
% Treated Within       
One Day
Average #             
Procedures
Log Average           
Charges
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Share*(Post) 0.043 0.042 0.109 0.104 0.593 0.524 0.01 -0.022 0.007 0.003 0.33 0.171
(0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.122)*** (0.119)*** (0.035) (0.034) (0.002)*** (0.001)** (0.155)** (0.144)
Constant 0.087 0.19 0.426 0.605 2.437 2.933 9.57 9.588 0.045 0.002 6.904 3.933
(0.002)*** (0.029)*** (0.005)*** (0.056)*** (0.025)*** (0.307)*** (0.008)*** (0.115)*** (0.001)*** (0.012) (0.080)*** (0.679)***
Observations 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396
R-squared 0.6 0.68 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.86 0.87 0.11 0.16 0.69 0.69
With Zip Code-Specific Time Trends:
Share*(Post) 0.039 0.034 0.011 0.009 0.067 0.054 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 -0.107 -0.029
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.020) (0.019) (0.136) (0.133) (0.026) (0.025) (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.129) (0.118)
Constant 0.073 0.184 0.442 0.608 2.426 2.744 9.536 9.591 0.046 0.002 7.199 4.31
(0.002)*** (0.027)*** (0.004)*** (0.046)*** (0.021)*** (0.266)*** (0.008)*** (0.108)*** (0.001)*** (0.012) (0.079)*** (0.631)***
Observations 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396
R-squared 0.65 0.72 0.61 0.64 0.61 0.64 0.88 0.89 0.13 0.18 0.72 0.73
Control Variables N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Zip Code Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
% Die
Average Length         
of Stay
Zip codes are only included if they have 15 or more discharges in every quarter.  All regressions are weighted by the number of heart disease discharges.  Standard errors are clustered by 
zip code.  Control variables include the percent of discharges with demographic characteristics such as race, gender, and age categories; with expected payer such as Medicare and private 
insurance; with co-morbidities such as hypertension, diabetes, and heart failure; and admission through the ER.
% Intensive       
Treatment
% Treated Within       
One Day
Average #             
Procedures
Log Average           
Charges
% Die
Average Length         
of Stay
Table 2.8: IV Regression Results
% Intensive       
Treatment
% Treated Within       
One Day
Average #             
Procedures
Log Average           
Charges
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Pre-Merge Share * Year 1 (pre) -0.002 0.003 0.046 0.044 0.166 0.142 -0.048 -0.048 0.004 0.002 -0.166 -0.156
(0.007) (0.006) (0.014)*** (0.012)*** (0.111) (0.100) (0.036) (0.033) (0.002)* (0.002) (0.106) (0.107)
Pre-Merge Share * Year 1 (post) 0.03 0.033 0.047 0.046 0.19 0.164 -0.043 -0.047 0.006 0.003 -0.055 -0.04
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.016)*** (0.014)*** (0.095)** (0.090)* (0.035) (0.034) (0.002)** (0.002) (0.113) (0.107)
Pre-Merge Share * Year 2 (post) 0.032 0.031 0.058 0.054 0.305 0.273 0.002 -0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.028 -0.019
(0.008)*** (0.006)*** (0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.118)*** (0.112)** (0.035) (0.035) (0.002) (0.002) (0.127) (0.114)
Pre-Merge Share * Year 3 (post) 0.029 0.033 0.069 0.068 0.364 0.345 -0.009 -0.019 0.006 0.004 0.059 0.016
(0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.124)*** (0.118)*** (0.037) (0.037) (0.002)*** (0.002) (0.123) (0.115)
Pre-Merge Share * Year 4 (post) 0.039 0.038 0.083 0.081 0.551 0.49 -0.007 -0.033 0.007 0.003 0.253 0.125
(0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.113)*** (0.108)*** (0.036) (0.035) (0.002)*** (0.002) (0.141)* (0.137)
Pre-Merge Share * Year 5+ (post) 0.041 0.039 0.139 0.131 0.78 0.681 0.035 -0.012 0.006 0.002 0.501 0.263
(0.011)*** (0.009)*** (0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.119)*** (0.118)*** (0.033) (0.034) (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.188)*** (0.178)
With Zip Code-Specific Time Trends:
Pre-Merge Share * Year 1 (pre) 0.001 0.003 0.016 0.019 0.052 0.06 -0.019 -0.016 0.004 0.003 -0.264 -0.265
(0.007) (0.006) (0.016) (0.015) (0.144) (0.137) (0.027) (0.026) (0.002)* (0.002) (0.108)** (0.121)**
Pre-Merge Share * Year 1 (post) 0.034 0.032 0.015 0.015 0.05 0.039 -0.016 -0.018 0.005 0.004 -0.211 -0.17
(0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.018) (0.017) (0.140) (0.134) (0.029) (0.028) (0.003)** (0.003) (0.134) (0.135)
Pre-Merge Share * Year 2 (post) 0.039 0.031 0.02 0.014 0.161 0.137 0.028 0.025 0.003 0.004 -0.198 -0.122
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.023) (0.022) (0.175) (0.169) (0.031) (0.031) (0.003) (0.003)* (0.137) (0.134)
Pre-Merge Share * Year 3 (post) 0.041 0.035 0.022 0.016 0.24 0.218 0.014 0.007 0.006 0.006 -0.066 -0.023
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.024) (0.022) (0.191) (0.186) (0.035) (0.036) (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.152) (0.148)
Pre-Merge Share * Year 4 (post) 0.054 0.041 0.025 0.015 0.409 0.33 0.003 -0.024 0.007 0.006 0.127 0.124
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.029) (0.027) (0.198)** (0.192)* (0.042) (0.041) (0.003)** (0.003)* (0.180) (0.178)
Pre-Merge Share * Year 5+ (post) 0.07 0.047 0.058 0.037 0.658 0.515 0.017 -0.033 0.008 0.007 0.284 0.242
(0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.032)* (0.029) (0.238)*** (0.233)** (0.047) (0.048) (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.188) (0.181)
Control Variables N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Zip Code Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
% Die
Average Length         
of Stay
Zip codes are only included if they have 15 or more discharges in every quarter.  All regressions are weighted by the number of heart disease discharges.  Standard errors are clustered by zip code.  
Control variables include the percent of discharges with demographic characteristics such as race, gender, and age categories; with expected payer such as Medicare and private insurance; with co-
morbidities such as hypertension, diabetes, and heart failure; and admission through the ER.
% Intensive       
Treatment
% Treated Within        
One Day
Average #              
Procedures
Log Average           
Charges
% Die
Average Length         
of Stay
Table 2.9: OLS Regressions on Timing Interacted Pre-Merge Share
% Intensive       
Treatment
% Treated Within        
One Day
Average #              
Procedures
Log Average           
Charges
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Pre-Merge Share*(Post) 0.051 0.049 0.064 0.061 0.479 0.440 0.028 0.018 0.000 -0.001 0.433 0.451
(0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.024)*** (0.023)*** (0.152)*** (0.149)*** (0.036) (0.036) (0.002) (0.002) (0.171)** (0.173)***
Satellite Share*(Post) -0.032 -0.030 0.081 0.078 0.047 -0.011 -0.044 -0.092 0.018 0.012 -0.419 -0.852
(0.024) (0.021) (0.047)* (0.043)* (0.260) (0.254) (0.068) (0.069) (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.325) (0.300)***
Constant 0.216 0.27 0.524 0.63 2.893 2.991 9.696 9.679 0.049 0.001 6.324 4.312
(0.002)*** (0.029)*** (0.004)*** (0.055)*** (0.025)*** (0.308)*** (0.008)*** (0.111)*** (0.001)*** -0.012 (0.081)*** (0.620)***
Observations 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396
R-squared 0.6 0.68 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.86 0.87 0.11 0.16 0.69 0.69
With Zip Code-Specific Time Trends:
Pre-Merge Share*(Post) 0.022 0.025 0.009 0.015 -0.049 -0.023 -0.017 -0.005 0.003 0.003 -0.126 -0.035
(0.009)** (0.008)*** (0.019) (0.018) (0.109) (0.102) (0.032) (0.029) (0.003) (0.003) (0.152) (0.139)
Satellite Share*(Post) 0.055 0.027 0.016 -0.010 0.471 0.372 0.032 0.006 0.005 0.007 -0.214 -0.206
(0.022)** (0.020) (0.037) (0.038) (0.220)** (0.220)* (0.080) (0.075) (0.006) (0.006) (0.349) (0.308)
Constant 0.217 0.272 0.523 0.663 2.89 3.018 9.699 9.716 0.05 -0.001 6.314 4.187
(0.002)*** (0.027)*** (0.003)*** (0.045)*** (0.020)*** (0.262)*** (0.008)*** (0.107)*** (0.001)*** -0.012 (0.081)*** (0.605)***
Observations 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396
R-squared 0.65 0.72 0.61 0.64 0.61 0.64 0.88 0.89 0.13 0.18 0.72 0.73
Control Variables N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Zip Code Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
% Die
Average Length        
of Stay
Zip codes are only included if they have 15 or more discharges in every quarter.  All regressions are weighted by the number of heart disease discharges.  Standard errors are clustered 
by zip code.  Control variables include the percent of discharges with demographic characteristics such as race, gender, and age categories; with expected payer such as Medicare and 
private insurance; with co-morbidities such as hypertension, diabetes, and heart failure; and admission through the ER.
% Intensive       
Treatment
% Treated Within       
One Day
Average #             
Procedures
Log Average           
Charges
% Die
Average Length        
of Stay
Table 2.10: OLS Regressions on Pre-Merge Merged and Satellite Shares
% Intensive       
Treatment
% Treated Within       
One Day
Average #             
Procedures
Log Average           
Charges
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Parent Share 0.024 0.016 0.905 0.902 0.024 0.019 0.917 0.916
(0.027) (0.024) (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.025) (0.022) (0.027)*** (0.027)***
Satellite Share -0.024 -0.009 0.659 0.657 -0.03 -0.004 0.739 0.739
(0.039) (0.037) (0.041)*** (0.041)*** (0.032) (0.031) (0.037)*** (0.037)***
Predicted DHHI 0.752 0.706 0.126 0.14 0.826 0.767 0.159 0.162
(0.166)*** (0.161)*** (0.154) (0.154) (0.143)*** (0.133)*** (0.145) (0.144)
Constant 0.261 0.156 0 0.021 0.261 0.158 -0.002 0.016
(0.003)*** (0.045)*** (0.001) (0.036) (0.002)*** (0.032)*** (0.001)** (0.022)
Observations 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396
R-squared 0.83 0.84 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.89 0.95 0.95
F statistic for instrument(s) 16.09 15.41 655.77 673.26 20.63 24.23 720.43 735.00
Control Variables N Y N Y N Y N Y
Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Zip Code Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2.11: First Stage Regressions of Share*(Post) and HHI on Parent & Satellite Shares and Predicted Change in HHI
without zip trends
Zip codes are only included if they have 15 or more discharges in every quarter.  All regressions are weighted by the number of heart 
disease discharges.  Standard errors are clustered by zip code.  Control variables include the percent of discharges with demographic 
characteristics such as race, gender, and age categories; with expected payer such as Medicare and private insurance; with co-morbidities 
such as hypertension, diabetes, and heart failure; and admission through the ER.
with zip trends
HHI Share * (Post) HHI Share * (Post)
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Share*(Post) 0.037 0.026 0.085 0.059 0.33 0.155 0.045 -0.01 0.008 0.005 0.324 0.186
(0.012)*** (0.010)** (0.028)*** (0.028)** (0.171)* (0.171) (0.056) (0.056) (0.003)*** (0.002)** (0.224) (0.200)
HHI 0.051 0.128 0.151 0.324 1.834 2.764 -0.247 -0.072 -0.016 -0.018 0.077 0.034
(0.077) (0.069)* (0.180) (0.200) (0.929)** (1.058)*** (0.277) (0.296) (0.015) (0.015) (1.031) (0.942)
Constant 0.083 0.194 0.413 0.614 2.289 3.014 9.59 9.586 0.047 0.002 6.898 3.934
(0.007)*** (0.029)*** (0.016)*** (0.057)*** (0.080)*** (0.314)*** (0.024)*** (0.116)*** (0.002)*** (0.012) (0.113)*** (0.684)***
Observations 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396
R-squared 0.6 0.68 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.49 0.86 0.87 0.11 0.16 0.69 0.69
With Zip Code-Specific Time Trends:
Share*(Post) 0.035 0.014 -0.011 -0.025 -0.017 -0.106 0.008 -0.006 0.006 0.007 0.021 0.155
(0.011)*** (0.011) (0.025) (0.025) (0.159) (0.159) (0.043) (0.043) (0.003)* (0.003)** (0.196) (0.185)
HHI 0.022 0.141 0.155 0.251 0.526 1.128 -0.033 0.064 -0.006 -0.015 -0.888 -1.351
(0.061) (0.070)** (0.139) (0.146)* (0.859) (0.897) (0.207) (0.215) (0.018) (0.019) (1.026) (0.943)
Constant 0.071 0.186 0.427 0.612 2.376 2.765 9.539 9.592 0.047 0.002 7.284 4.286
(0.006)*** (0.027)*** (0.014)*** (0.046)*** (0.088)*** (0.270)*** (0.021)*** (0.108)*** (0.002)*** (0.012) (0.133)*** (0.633)***
Observations 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396 47396
R-squared 0.65 0.71 0.6 0.63 0.61 0.64 0.88 0.89 0.13 0.18 0.72 0.73
Control Variables N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Zip Code Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Average Length        
of Stay
Log Average           
Charges % Die
Zip codes are only included if they have 15 or more discharges in every quarter.  All regressions are weighted by the number of heart disease discharges.  Standard errors are clustered by 
zip code.  Control variables include the percent of discharges with demographic characteristics such as race, gender, and age categories; with expected payer such as Medicare and 
private insurance; with co-morbidities such as hypertension, diabetes, and heart failure; and admission through the ER.
% Intensive       
Treatment
% Treated Within       
One Day
Average #             
Procedures
Table 2.12: IV Regressions Including HHI
Average Length        
of Stay
Log Average           
Charges % Die
% Intensive       
Treatment
% Treated Within       
One Day




* Only zip codes with at least 15 heart disease discharges in the merging quarter are shaded.
Figure 2.1: Fresno Community Hospital/Valley Medical Center Merged Market Shares at Time of Merger
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* Only zip codes with at least 15 heart disease discharges in the merging quarter are shaded.
Figure 2.2: Eden Medical Center/San Leandro Hospital One-Year Changes in Merged Market Shares
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i
* Only zip codes with at least 15 heart disease discharges in the merging quarter are shaded.
Figure 2.3: Fresno Community Hospital/Valley Medical Center One-Year Changes in Merged Market Shares
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* Only zip codes with at least 15 heart disease discharges in the merging quarter are shaded.




* Only zip codes with at least 15 heart disease discharges in the merging quarter are shaded.





Chapter 3: The Impact of Managed Care on State Medicaid 
Programs: Evidence from State and Local-Level Mandates 
 
Abstract: State governments began shifting large numbers of Medicaid enrollees 
from traditional fee-for-service into managed care during the 1990s, in part as a 
response to the rapid growth in Medicaid expenditures during this time period.  In 
theory, managed care organizations may be able to reduce costs through shifting 
utilization towards lower cost environments, such as physician offices instead of 
emergency rooms, and through negotiating lower prices with providers.  However, 
Medicaid reimbursement rates are already quite low, and splintering Medicaid 
enrollees into multiple insurance plans could reduce the efficiency of the program.  
Thus the impact on expenditures of shifting millions of Medicaid recipients into 
managed care programs is ultimately an empirical question.  We use state-level 
aggregate administrative data for the years 1991-2003 in conjunction with an 
instrument created from a unique data set on mandatory Medicaid managed care 
enrollment policies to estimate the average impact of Medicaid managed care on a 
national level.  Results suggest that this policy increased the expense of the Medicaid 
program, particularly for HMO-style insurance plans.  We also extend our analysis to 
investigate the impact of these policies on enrollment decisions.  Using CPS data, we 
find mixed responses to mandatory managed care policies, though all changes in 
take-up were small and did not appear to increase uninsurance rates. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The Medicaid program provided health insurance to more than 57 million 
U.S. residents during the 2005 calendar year, with expenditures totaling $312 billion 
(CMS 2009).  This expenditure figure is nearly three times the program’s 
expenditures in 1990 in real dollars.  Part of this increase was driven by an increase in 
program enrollment, which doubled during this 15-year period. At the same time, 
many states expanded the scope of the Medicaid program to create a safety net for 
their most vulnerable residents (Coughlin, et al 1999). 
The expanding role of Medicaid has contributed to a fifty percent increase in 




jointly financed by state and federal governments.  Thus, its expenditure expansion 
poses a financing issue for both levels of government.  For example, Medicaid 
comprises over one fifth of state government spending (NASBO 2008)20.  And the 
share of federal outlays spent on the Medicaid program has increased from 3.3 
percent in 1990 to 7.4 percent in 2005 (CBO 2009). 
Because Medicaid is administered by states, state governments introduce the 
majority of program reforms and innovations.  During the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
ballooning private health expenditures led to a closer examination of how traditional 
fee-for-service (FFS) insurance plans incentivize physicians and patients to prescribe 
and consume medical treatments without consideration for their cost.  This, in turn, 
led to the development of managed care style insurance plans.  Perhaps partly in 
response to the rapid increase in program expenditures, states followed this 
innovation and began shifting large numbers of Medicaid recipients from traditional 
fee-for-service into managed care during the 1990s.  This led to a fivefold increase in 
the fraction of Medicaid recipients in managed care plans, from 11 percent in 1991 to 
55 percent by 2000.  Figure 3.1 displays the pattern of Medicaid managed care 
(MMC) penetration rates from 1990 to 2005.  Penetration rates begin ramping up 
rapidly in 1993, and began to level off in 1999.  It is interesting to note that the 
percent growth in total payments (in 2000 $) fell during this period of rapid expansion 
in MMC penetration rates21. 
                                                 
20 Medicaid expenditures tie with elementary and secondary education as the largest share of state 
expenditures (NASB 2008). 





Despite the anecdotal evidence presented in Figure 3.1, it is unclear whether 
contracting out to private managed care insurers reduced program expenditures.  On 
one hand, managed care firms have an incentive to keep patients healthy because their 
revenue does not depend on payments to providers.  This incentive could influence 
managed care insurers to negotiate lower rates with providers and to keep enrollees 
healthy through increasing access to and utilization of preventive care.  In fact, 
research shows that managed care firms successfully negotiated lower reimbursement 
rates in the private market (Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse 2000; Dor, Grossman, 
and Koroukian 2004; Shen and Melnick 2006). 
More specifically for Medicaid enrollees, managed care programs may also 
increase access to primary care through creating networks of providers that are 
willing to treat Medicaid patients.  Increasing access to primary care is important 
because of the possibility that Medicaid enrollees may substitute expensive 
emergency room services for much less expensive care in a doctor’s office.  This 
substitution may stem from difficulty in finding a physician who accepts Medicaid 
insurance (Zuckerman, et al 1997).  Lack of access to primary care may result in 
putting off care for a minor health issue until it becomes severe or inappropriate 
management of a chronic disease such as diabetes or asthma. 
However, there are significant factors that challenge the goal of reducing 
program expenditures.  First, one of the primary methods through which managed 
care firms have reduced health care expenditures is through negotiating lower rates 
with providers (Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse 2000 and Dor, Grossman, and 




to hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers are already very low to begin 
with (Gruber 2003).  Thus, managed care firms may be unable to reduce costs in this 
fashion.  The extent to which enrollment in a managed care plan is voluntary could 
also increase expenditures, particularly if healthier recipients are more likely to enroll 
in managed care and if premiums are set using average per person Medicaid 
expenditures as a benchmark.   
One of the benefits of state administration of health insurance benefits is that 
administrative costs are spread among a large number of enrollees.  Contracting out 
insuring services to several firms may reduce the efficiency of the program because 
these administrative costs are now split among smaller groups of individuals.  In 
addition, the extent to which MMC programs are designed to maintain the expanded 
role of Medicaid described above will also counteract the likelihood of reducing 
Medicaid expenditures. 
When one considers all of these facts, it is clear that both the sign and 
magnitude of the effect of MMC on Medicaid expenditures are theoretically 
ambiguous.  Duggan (2004) investigated this topic in California and found that 
contracting out to managed care organizations increased Medicaid program 
expenditures22.  While California is a large and diverse state, these results may not 
generalize nationally.  For example, their Medicaid reimbursement rates are 
especially low, dampening the ability of managed care plans to reduce expenditures 
                                                 
22 Two other papers have analyzed a MMC demonstration program in Florida  (Buchanan, Leibowitz, 
and Keesey 1996; Goldman, Leibowitz, and Buchanan).  Both found lower expenditures for managed 
care enrollees as compared to those enrolled in traditional fee-for-service.  However, as these study a 




through this channel (Duggan 2004).  Thus, it would be useful to assess the effects of 
contracting out to managed care firms on a national level.   
In this study, we use aggregate state-level administrative data along with 
information on MMC enrollment to estimate the causal effect of MMC on Medicaid 
expenditures.  This data includes all expenditures for the Medicaid program, such as 
administrative expenditures and payments to medical providers and managed care 
insurers.  Because managed care enrollment may be endogenous, we use a unique 
data set with information on mandatory MMC policies to instrument for managed 
care enrollment in determining its impact on expenditures. We find evidence 
suggesting that it is unlikely that contracting out to managed care firms has reduced 
program expenditures.  Instead, it appears that the MMC program has actually 
increased the burden of Medicaid on state budgets.  Contracts with health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) as opposed to other types of managed care 
organizations seem to be driving this increase. 
A second possible effect of MMC programs is that they may have reduced the 
desirability of Medicaid enrollment. Reduced Medicaid take-up could result in an 
increase in uninsurance among the state’s most vulnerable population.  To investigate 
this possibility, we use data from the March supplement of the CPS to study how the 
pattern of insurance enrollment responds to mandatory MMC policies.  We find small 
increases in Medicaid enrollment among some populations, and small decreases in 





The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides 
background information on MMC and how states implemented it in addition to a 
literature review.  Section 3.3 describes the data and estimation strategy for the 
impact of MMC on program expenditures.  Section 3.4 discusses the first stage 
results, while section 3.5 discusses the expenditure results.  Section 3.6 contains the 
analysis on enrollment, and section 3.7 concludes. 
3.2 Medicaid Managed Care Background 
3.2.1 How States Implemented Medicaid Managed Care 
States adopted MMC policies slowly in the early 1990s, as evidenced by 
Table 3.1.  In 1991, only 10.8 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries were enrolled in an 
MMC plan, a large fraction of whom were voluntarily enrolled.  Enrollment in 
managed care accelerated beginning in 1994, when penetration increased to 24.6 
percent.  Penetration doubled again by 1998, increasing to 52.5 percent.  Increases in 
managed care enrollment came from additional states adopting managed care 
programs and from within-state program expansions.  For example, Tennessee, 
Rhode Island, and Hawaii began statewide managed care programs in the mid-1990s, 
while California rolled out its MMC program gradually across several years. 
MMC programs vary in several ways.  For example, they vary from least 
comprehensive, primary care case management plans (PCCMs), to most 
comprehensive, HMOs.  PCCMs incorporate a combination of gatekeeping by a 
primary care provider (PCP) with Fee-For-Service (FFS) style payments, while 




Capitated payments are set fees per enrollee that are fixed regardless of how much or 
how little care an enrollee utilizes.  Because states still pay providers directly at FFS 
rates for PCCM enrollees, these plans are unlikely to affect service prices.  However, 
plans that are paid capitated rates pay providers directly and thus have an incentive to 
lower prices.  Another category of managed care plan is the prepaid health plan 
(PHP), which is like an HMO but may incorporate partially capitated instead of fully 
capitated payments.   
Table 3.1 shows how enrollment in these three plan types varied over time.  
Enrollment in HMOs increased the most from 1993-1998, growing from 6.6 percent 
of Medicaid enrollees in 1993 to 35.9 percent in 1998, and creeping up for the 
remainder of the time period.  Enrollment in PCCMs leveled off in 1997 at 
approximately 14 percent.  PHP enrollment didn’t pick up until the late 1990s, though 
by 2005, 25 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries were enrolled in a PHP23.   
Medicaid managed care policies also vary by whether managed care 
enrollment is mandatory.  Mandatory enrollment is defined as whether an enrollee is 
automatically assigned to a managed care plan if she does not enroll voluntarily.  In 
some states, mandatory enrollment was limited to those eligible through federal 
welfare programs.  In others, mandatory enrollment includes most or all eligibility 
categories.  Some managed care programs were voluntary for all beneficiaries.  Table 
3.2 shows how usage of voluntary versus mandatory policies has changed over time24.  
                                                 
23 It is worth noting that enrollment in these different plan types exceeded overall MMC enrollment 
because several HMOs and a number of PHPs are for specific, carved-out services such as mental 
health or substance abuse treatment. 
24 The data in this table is constructed using annual county-level population estimates in conjunction 




The data in this table represents the percentage of state population that was subject to 
the various MMC policies25. 
Early MMC programs often utilized voluntary enrollment policies, 
particularly favoring voluntary HMO enrollment.  However, by 1996, mandatory 
enrollment policies were more prevalent.  This preference for mandatory enrollment 
increased throughout the next five years.  Like Table 3.1, Table 3.2 also shows that 
usage of both PCCMs and HMOs increased over time, though HMO usage was more 
widespread.  In several counties, both PCCM and HMO policies existed and 
enrollment in one was mandatory.  In these cases, an individual was automatically 
enrolled in one of the two plan types if she did not enroll voluntarily. 
Some populations, such as those who qualify through the Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) program, are less likely to be subject to mandatory enrollment 
policies.  These individuals consume a disproportionate share of Medicaid 
expenditures: in 2005, disabled beneficiaries comprised 14.2 percent of Medicaid 
enrollment, and accounted for a much greater share of Medicaid expenditures at 43.4 
percent (SSA 2008).  While the potential for cost cutting may be greatest among these 
individuals, they are also the most vulnerable members of the Medicaid population.  
According to the 2000 CMS National Summary Report, 20 of 36 programs with 
mandatory HMO policies and 10 of 13 with mandatory PCCM policies included 
disabled individuals within the mandatory requirement26.  Unlike total Medicaid 
expenditures, however, disabled individuals comprise only 26.6 percent of capitated 
                                                 
25 For the purposes of this table, a county is considered to have a mandatory MMC policy if the MMC 
plan is mandatory for federal welfare beneficiaries. 
26 The CMS National Summary Report data is current to June 30, 2000.  Four states have both a PCCM 




payments in 2005 while still accounting for 12.0 percent of enrollees with capitated 
claims (CMS 2009b). 
 States set per-enrollee MMC payments in a variety of ways.  Payments to 
PCCM providers were fairly consistent.  Providers are paid a monthly nominal 
amount for each enrollee in exchange for ensuring access to primary care services and 
for providing gatekeeping services.  This payment generally ranges from $3 to $6.  
Payments to HMOs and other capitated plans vary across states.  The Urban Institute 
(UI) conducted surveys in 1998 and 2001 to determine how these capitated rates were 
set.  States set payment rates to HMOs using one of three broad methodologies: 
individual negotiation with plans, administrative rate setting, and competitive 
bidding.  While both administrative rate setting and competitive bidding incorporated 
negotiation with plans, this was a secondary technique.   
Each method has its strengths and weaknesses.  Administrative rate setting is 
fairly simple from an administrative perspective, though it requires states to pick the 
‘correct’ payment rate.  In general, these rates are a discounted estimate of FFS 
expenditures.  Competitive bidding has the attractive feature of allowing market 
competition to set capitated rates, but it is a complex process from an administrative 
perspective.  One-third of the 14 states that utilized competitive bidding in 1998 
switched to another method by 2001.  Only one state started using this method 
between the two surveys.  Some states also incorporated reinsurance rates into their 
contracts and assumed some of the risk for expensive enrollees.  Overall, there was a 




in rate adjustment policies.  This variation does not appear to be driven by geographic 
differences in health care costs (Holahan and Suzuki 2001, Holahan, et al 1999). 
3.2.2 Literature Review/The Impact of MMC on Costs 
The implementation of MMC policies has the potential to either decrease or 
increase Medicaid expenditures.  One mechanism through which managed care 
programs are likely to decrease costs is through effectively managing care.  Previous 
research suggests that MMC programs are often effective in shifting utilization from 
hospitals to doctors’ offices, though some of this evidence is mixed27.  Managed care 
programs also have a track record of reducing unit costs for the same services as 
compared to traditional FFS insurance plans.  For example, Cutler, McClellan, and 
Newhouse (2000) found that managed care insurance plans in Massachusetts 
succeeded in cutting costs in the private insurance market by up to 30-40 percent.  
Focusing on heart disease treatment allowed them to determine that the cost savings 
stemmed from negotiating lower rates with providers rather than a reduction in 
servces.  Dor, Grossman, and Koroukian (2004) find similar results for a broader 
geographic area. 
While both of these studies use data from the early and mid 1990s, Shen and 
Melnick (2006) assess whether the impact of managed care organizations falls with 
the backlash against their strict structure in the following decade.  They find that the 
impact on hospital operating expenditures and patient revenue grew in the late 1990s, 
and consequently fell to early-1990s levels in the early 2000s.  Thus it is likely that 
managed care organizations continue to have a real downward pressure on the cost of 
                                                 
27 See, for example, Garrett, Davidoff, and Yemane 2003, Garrett and Zuckerman 2005, Bindman, et al 




medical care.  However, there are several mechanisms through which MMC 
programs may actually increase costs without improving quality of care. 
 One concern only applies to voluntary HMO policies.  There is evidence that 
voluntary HMO policies lend themselves to favorable selection by insurers so that 
healthier Medicaid enrollees are more likely to choose to enroll in an HMO (Glied, et 
al 1997 and Mitchell and Gaskin 2005).  Thus capitated payments that are based on 
total FFS expenditures will overestimate average payments for voluntary enrollees.  
Another concern stems from the ability of HMOs to reduce the cost of care.  
Medicaid FFS rates are traditionally low already, making it difficult to negotiate a 
lower rate with health care providers (Garrett and Zuckerman 2005).  In addition, 
even if HMOs are more efficient than Medicaid FFS, some states allow numerous 
plans to participate so long as they each accept the set premium.  For example, nine 
plans signed up to participate in the Cleveland MMC market (Mayer 1997).  There is 
a natural tension between competition and efficiency because plans that face more 
competition are more likely to increase plan quality to attract enrollees, but the 
addition of more insurance plans covering the same population means that 
administrative costs and risk pooling are spread among fewer individuals in each 
plan. 
 An additional issue is that Medicaid programs now have a vested interest in 
keeping state health care safety nets intact.  In some cases, Medicaid payments have 
partially subsidized health care for the uninsured, and in others, Medicaid patients’ 
use has allowed safety net providers to continue operating.  Because states would like 




programs to continue to protect these providers.  These policies range from financial 
incentives for including safety net providers in MMC networks to encouraging these 
providers to develop Medicaid-only managed care plans.  Each of these policies 
involves additional expenditures to maintain the safety net (Coughlin, et al 1999 and 
Maloy 2000).  While this is a laudable goal, it potentially clashes with the goal of 
cutting Medicaid expenditures. 
Overall, enrolling Medicaid recipients in managed care plans has the potential 
to both improve health outcomes and reduce costs by increasing access to regular 
primary care and shifting utilization from hospital emergency rooms to physician 
offices.  However, as described above, there are a number of potential roadblocks that 
states need to overcome in order for these policies to succeed in reducing 
expenditures.  The impact of MMC policies on Medicaid expenditures remains an 
empirical question. 
Thus far, there has been one state-level study on the impact of MMC on 
Medicaid expenditures.  Duggan (2004) investigated the impact of the gradual roll-
out of a mandatory MMC program in California.  This research studied the 
introductions of 19 separate county-level programs to identify changes in 
expenditures.  These 19 programs followed one of three basic formats, which 
determined the number of plans operating in the county as well as the extent to which 
competitive bidding was necessary to operate.  Ultimately, this study found that 
MMC increased Medicaid expenditures.  Additional specifications found that 
counties with single, county-operated managed care plans have larger expenditures 




that Medicaid-only HMOs may be less efficient and that less competition for 
contracts results in larger premiums and thus higher expenditures.   
While this analysis incorporated several different managed care programs in 
varied demographic settings, it may not be nationally representative.  As stated in its 
conclusion, California Medicaid reimbursement rates are lower than average, giving 
MMC plans less ability to cut costs.  In addition, each of these programs follows an 
HMO-style managed care plan.  Several states utilize PCCM plans as well.  These 
may have a different effect on expenditures than HMOs, especially since they have 
the potential to reign in excess utilization but only directly involve nominal additional 
payments.  However, PCCMs may also involve higher expenditures if the incentive to 
limit excess utilization is insufficient, resulting in additional utilization when 
combined with an increased access to primary care.  For these reasons, a national 
analysis is necessary to determine the effect of MMC on Medicaid expenditures. 
 
3.3 Data and Estimation Strategy 
3.3.1 Medicaid Expenditure and Managed Care Enrollment Data 
The data for this analysis comes from several sources.  Expenditure data 
comes from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Financial 
Management Reports, which are compiled from quarterly reports submitted by each 
state.  These reports include spending in various categories, such as administrative 
services, inpatient hospital care, pharmaceuticals, and outpatient care.  Beginning in 




Managed care expenditures for programs besides targeted case management were also 
reported separately beginning in 1998.   
Expenditures in several categories as well as total net expenditures for each 
major category are reported in Table 3.3.  One of the more striking rows is 
prescription drugs, for which expenditures more than quadrupled from 1990-2005.  
Other major expenditure categories, including inpatient and outpatient expenditures, 
grow a great deal during this time period as well.  Likewise, real managed care 
expenditures increased by nearly 70 percent from 2000 to 2005. This increase 
transpired after the majority of MMC policy expansion, so it was likely driven by an 
increase in per-enrollee payments rather than increases in enrollments. 
Medicaid managed care enrollment data comes from the Medicaid Managed 
Care Enrollment Reports, which are available for the years 1991-200628.  These 
reports list the number of individuals in each MMC plan across the country as of June 
30 of each year as well as the type of plan, such as HMO or PCCM.  In order to 
calculate an accurate measure of MMC enrollment as a percentage of total 
enrollment, overall Medicaid enrollment as of June 30 of each year is necessary29.  
This figure is included in the Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment Reports beginning 
in 1996.  For 1991 through 1995, Medicaid enrollment is available by fiscal year in 
the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin.  Enrollment as of 
June 30 is estimated for these years by deflating the fiscal year enrollment numbers 
by the ratio of fiscal year enrollment to June 30 enrollment in 1996. 
                                                 
28 In our analysis below, we only use data through 2003 because of data limitations with our 
instrument. 
29 The fiscal year enrollment figure includes individuals who dropped out of the program by the end of 




 Enrollment patterns in MMC vary widely across states.  Some states, such as 
South Carolina, have very low managed care penetration rates throughout the time 
period (see Figure 3.2).  Other states follow a pattern similar to that of New Jersey.  
This second group of states experienced a sharp increase in managed care penetration 
in the mid-1990s, followed by a plateau in enrollment for the remainder of the time 
period.  And some states, such as Pennsylvania, encouraged managed care policies 
more gradually, beginning with a few counties and slowly expanding across the state.  
This last group of states experienced a gradual increase in managed care penetration 
rates throughout the decade. 
3.3.2 Identification Strategy 
As discussed previously, enrollment in voluntary managed care plans has the 
potential to suffer from selection bias.  Healthier Medicaid enrollees are more likely 
to choose to enroll in MMC plans voluntarily.  If these enrollees are easier and 
cheaper for managed care plans to insure, then OLS estimates that use average 
Medicaid expenditures per recipient and managed care penetration rates could be 
biased downward.  To address this possible endogeneity, we construct an instrument 
from mandatory MMC policies.  UI conducted surveys in 1998 and 2001, in which 
they compiled county-level MMC policies for the years 1990 through 2001.  The 
results of these surveys allowed UI to identify if and what type of managed care 
policy was in effect for each county in each year30.   
                                                 
30 The survey was constructed to identify managed care policies for the federal welfare population.  




The raw data identified whether a PCCM and/or HMO plan was available for 
Medicaid enrollees31.  Availability of each of these plans was broken down into 
whether enrollment was voluntary or mandatory.  From this raw data, UI constructed 
variables that characterized the nature of the MMC environment for the county-year 
observation.  A county could be characterized as having one of the following policies: 
no MMC, voluntary MMC only, mandatory PCCM, mandatory HMO, and mixed 
mandatory.  The last category, mixed mandatory, represents a county in which both 
HMO and PCCM plans are available and enrollment in one of the plans is mandatory. 
 Because county-level Medicaid enrollment is not readily available, our 
instrument for mandatory enrollment in a managed care plan is constructed using 
annual county population totals.  The UI county characterizations allow us to 
construct a dummy variable for whether Medicaid enrollees in a county are subject to 
a mandatory managed care policy.  We use this dummy variable and estimates of the 
number of poor people living in a county to construct the percent of a state’s 
Medicaid population that would be subject to a mandatory managed care policy32. 
This instrument is similar to the one used by Currie and Fahr (2005).  They 
used the percentage of children in a state that would be subject to a mandatory 
managed care policy as an instrument for the percentage of Medicaid children 
enrolled in a managed care plan to estimate the impact of managed care enrollment on 
                                                 
31 PHP plans are included in the survey data and are classified as PCCM or HMO according to how 
individual states reported them in the survey data. 
32 This assumes that the distribution of Medicaid enrollees is similar to the distribution of individuals 
living in poverty.  Our first stage will be weakened to the extent that this is not true.  Replacing the 
number of poor people with the number of poor children aged 0-17, however, yields similar results to 




utilization and program participation of children33.  Table 3.4 shows the distribution 
of the population living in poverty subject to mandatory MMC policies by state for 
selected years.  Many states rolled out mandatory policies rapidly statewide.  Other 
states rolled these policies out more gradually across the time period.  A handful of 
states subject few, if any, of their population to mandatory policies.   This table, and 
the analysis that follows below, carries the 2001 policy data through 2003, thus 
assuming that there are no new mandates in these years.  There is very little change in 
county-level policies beyond 1999, suggesting that the 2001 policies are a reasonable 
approximation for the two subsequent years.  We extend our study through 2003 
instead of limiting it to 2001 in order to include additional post-policy years in our 
analysis. 
In addition to variation in policy timing, there is also variation in type of 
mandatory policies.  Table 3.5 shows the distribution of mandatory managed care 
across the three categories of mandatory policies: HMO only, mixed mandatory, and 
PCCM only.  Utilization of each increases slowly in the first half of the 1990s.  
Mandatory PCCM shares drifted up slightly for the remainder of the analysis period.  
Mixed mandatory policy shares increased for a few years, and then level off, while 
mandatory HMO policy shares increased even further.  Particularly as time passes, 
mandatory HMO policies are much more prevalent than the other two policy types. 
 One possible concern with this instrument is with the potential for legislative 
endogeneity.  For example, IV estimates would be biased if states and counties 
adopted mandatory managed care policies in response to an expected change in 
                                                 
33 Currie and Fahr use the National Summary of State Medicaid Managed Care Program reports to 
identify counties with mandatory programs.  Percent mandatory descriptive statistics are similar for the 




expenditures or change in enrollee characteristics.  However, managed care programs 
required approval from CMS to be implemented, and it is likely that this process was 
unpredictable in its timing.  Thus it is unlikely that the timing of implementation was 
related to changes in Medicaid enrollment or expenditures.   
 As described above, our main first stage and structural equations can be 
written in the following format: 
      sttsststst XdPercentManPercentMC 111111                (1) 
      sttsststst XPercentMCllExpPerEnro 222222)ln(              (2) 
with s and t indexing states and years, respectively.  PercentMCst represents the 
percentage of state s’s Medicaid beneficiaries that was enrolled in a managed care 
program in year t, and PercentMandst represents the percentage of state s’s poor 
population that lived in a county with a mandatory managed care enrollment policy in 
year t.  ExpPerEnrollst represents the per enrollee expenditures for the state-year 
observation, so the dependent variable for the reduced form equation is the log of per 
enrollee expenditures.   
 Since the two primary forms of managed care, HMOs and PCCMs, are vastly 
different from each other in both practice and payments, it is possible that they have 
different effects on expenditures.  To explore this possibility, we divide managed care 
percentage into percent of Medicaid recipients enrolled in HMO and PCCM plans 
separately.  Likewise, we separate out the percentage of the population subject to 
mandatory MMC policies into the three mandatory policies described above.  These 
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 It should be noted that PercentHMO and PercentPCCM do not cover all 
managed care enrollees.  PHPs, the other most utilized form of MMC, are not 
included because many of these plans are for targeted types of care.  Including PHP 
enrollment would vastly increase the likelihood of double-counting enrollees. 
 
3.4 First-Stage Results for MMC Enrollment 
 The first stage results are reported in Table 3.6.  The first triple of columns 
comes from equation (1) above.  The second and third triples come from equations 
(4) and (5) above.  Within each triple, the first column includes state and year fixed 
effects.  The second column adds control variables, and the third column adds state-
specific trends.  The control variables include the percentage of Medicaid recipients 
enrolled in AFDC, the percentage of Medicaid recipients receiving Social 
Supplementary Income (SSI) benefits, the unemployment rate in June of each year, 
and the year’s average poverty rate.  The first two control variables are constructed 




Administration’s Supplemental Statistical Bulletin, assuming that all of these 
individuals are enrolled in Medicaid as well. 
 The results listed suggest a very strong relationship between mandatory MMC 
policies and actual managed care enrollment.  The coefficient in column 3 in suggests 
that a 10 percentage point increase in the population subject to mandatory MMC 
leads to a 4 percentage point increase in enrollment in managed care.  The magnitude 
of the first stage is very similar to the first stage relationship found in Duggan (2004).  
It is unsurprising that this relationship is well below one-to-one, especially because 
some individuals enrolled in managed care voluntarily before participation became 
mandatory.  In addition, more vulnerable Medicaid recipients, such as those who are 
blind or disabled, are not always subject to mandatory MMC policies.  There also 
may have been a lag in implementation for new enrollees. 
 Columns 6 and 9 similarly suggest strong relationships between the various 
mandatory MMC policies and enrollment in HMOs and PCCMs.  In particular, 
differences in both magnitude and statistical significance indicate that mixed 
mandatory policies are more strongly predictive of PCCM enrollment than of HMO 
enrollment.  This suggests that enrollees in mixed mandatory counties are much more 
likely to enroll in PCCM plans, whether by choice or automatic enrollment.  
Mandatory HMO policies and mandatory PCCM policies are solid predictors of 





3.5 Results for Medicaid Expenditures 
 According to tables available in the Medicaid Statistical Information System 
Data Mart (CMS 2009b), capitated payments account for only 16.7 percent of total 
Medicaid expenditures in 2005.  As discussed above, beneficiaries that are disabled or 
otherwise likely to consume intensive quantities of medical services are less likely to 
enroll in managed care plans.  This contributes to the relatively small percentage 
comprised by capitated payments.  Recall, for example, that the 14.2 percent of 
enrollees who were disabled in 2005 accounted for nearly one-half of that year’s 
expenditures.  And while PCCM plans have the potential to affect FFS-reimbursed 
utilization, a smaller share of the population is enrolled in these plans.  As such, 
contracting out to managed care organizations would need to have a large effect on 
expenditures in order to be detectible in the aggregated totals.   
The first panel of Table 3.7 shows the IV results for both specifications of the 
expenditure regressions.  Like Table 3.6, each triple of columns represents 
regressions including state and year fixed effects, followed by adding controls, and 
finishing with adding state-specific trends.  The coefficient of 0.124 in the first 
column suggests that for every 10 percentage point increase in MMC enrollment, 
expenditures increase by 1.24 percent.  When controls are added, the magnitude falls 
to 1.12 percent, though the statistical precision increases.  Column 3 shows that when 
state-specific trends are included, the magnitude falls even further, to 0.76 percent, 
and statistical precision falls as well.  Combined, these results suggest that the 




The last three columns represent specifications from equations (3) through (5).  
The coefficients in column 4 suggest that an increase in HMO enrollment of 10 
percentage points induces a 2.43 percent increase in Medicaid expenditures, while 
PCCM enrollment does not appear to have an effect.  Adding controls reduces the 
coefficient on the HMO percentage variable, though increases the magnitude and 
statistical significance of the coefficient on the PCCM percentage variable.  However, 
including state-specific trends shows that the increases from PCCM enrollment were 
driven by trends in expenditures.  This is not surprising given that there is little 
incentive for PCCM plans to reduce utilization.  The effect of HMO enrollment is 
robust to the inclusion of state trends, which is consistent with the findings in Duggan 
(2004).  The coefficient of 0.169 in column 6 translates to a 1.69 percent increase in 
Medicaid expenditures for every 10 percentage point increase in HMO enrollment.  
In 2000, nominal Medicaid expenditures per enrollee totaled $6383.  Thus, a 
10 percentage point increase in HMO enrollment would corresponds to a $107 
increase in expenditures on average.  Referring back to Table 3.1, HMO enrollment 
increased from 25.0 percent in 1997 to 35.9 percent in 1998.  Per enrollee 
expenditures increased from $5385 in 1997 to $5913 in 1998.  Our regression results 
suggest that approximately one-fifth of this increase could have been driven by the 
increase in HMO enrollment.  Considering the low percentage of expenditures that 
cover capitated payments, the magnitude of the increase in expenditures induced by 
HMO enrollment may be much larger34. 
                                                 
34 For example, if per capita expenditures are equal to $5385, HMO penetration is 25 percent, and 
capitated payments are 15 percent of overall enrollment, per capita capitated payments are 




 In the other two panels of Table 3.7, we investigate the impact of MMC 
enrollment on administrative expenditures and on Medicaid enrollment.  Given that 
contracting out to managed care firms requires state Medicaid programs to coordinate 
with a number of actors and that setting premium rates is documented as challenging, 
it is plausible that this procedure would increase administrative costs.  We use a 
similar set of estimating equations as above, replacing the log of per enrollee 
Medicaid expenditures with the log of per enrollee administrative expenditures.  The 
second panel of Table 3.7 presents these results.  The magnitude of the coefficients on 
the various managed care percentage variables is somewhat similar to the coefficients 
for log of total Medicaid expenditures, though the estimates are not nearly as precise. 
 These results suggest that MMC programs may increase administrative 
expenses in addition to overall expenditures.  This implication would be consistent 
with the previously documented challenge in setting up the HMO contracts.  Setting 
up competitive bidding for managed care contracts was particularly difficult as 
evidenced by the number of states that substituted another method for setting 
premiums between 1998 and 2001.  However, these estimates are very imprecise, and 
thus we cannot draw any substantive conclusions. 
 In the next set of specifications, the left hand side of the structural equation is 
replaced with June 30 Medicaid enrollment as a percentage of state population.  
These specifications investigate the effect of managed care enrollment on Medicaid 
enrollment to determine whether MMC alters the attractiveness of the Medicaid 
program to enrollees.  Enrollment falling could suggest that a vulnerable population is 
                                                                                                                                           
in capitated payments per HMO enrollee.  Thus, per HMO enrollee capititated payments increase by 




made more vulnerable by the introduction of MMC policies.  Turning to the third 
panel of Table 3.7, it appears that MMC policies may, in fact, have reduced take-up 
of the Medicaid benefit among eligible individuals.   
The coefficient of -0.017 in column 3 suggests that a 10 percentage point 
increase in managed care enrollment would induce a 0.17 percentage point drop in 
Medicaid enrollment as a share of state population.  Likewise, the coefficient of -
0.029 in column 6 would induce a 0.29 percentage point drop for the same magnitude 
increase in HMO enrollment.  Considering again the increase in managed care and 
HMO enrollment from 1997 to 1998, these coefficients imply a reduction of 
approximately 0.02 percentage points from the 11.5 share of the population enrolled 
in Medicaid in 1997.  In 1998, enrollment drops to 11.1 percent of the population.  
The increase in managed care enrollment could account for approximately 4.6 percent 
of this decrease in enrollment.   
If MMC programs reduce enrollment, then this effect would dampen the 
increase in Medicaid expenditures slightly.  However, there might be a concern for 
who is reducing their take-up of Medicaid benefits and whether they substitute into 
private insurance or uninsurance.  This aggregate-level data does not enable us to 
determine who is altering their take-up decision.  Nor does it enable us to identify the 






3.6 Enrollment Responses to MMC 
 To further explore the impact of mandatory MMC policies on enrollment, we 
turn to individual-level data.  This type of data, unlike the administrative data used 
above, enables us to control for other components of a person’s life that may impact 
their likelihood of Medicaid enrollment.  For example, children are more likely to be 
enrolled in Medicaid than adults, as are children of poor or single-mother households 
compared to children of wealthier or two-parent households.  The data set that has 
primarily been used for examining the likelihood of Medicaid enrollment in addition 
to investigating health outcomes and utilization is the National Health Interview 
Survey (NHIS).  The drawback with this survey, however, is that state identifiers are 
not included in the publicly accessible version of the data set beyond 1994.  
 In order to study a similar time period as the one we analyzed above, we take 
advantage of the CPS.  Compared to the NHIS, the main drawback of the CPS is that 
it does not include information on health status or healthcare utilization.  However, it 
is a large individual-level data set that includes state identifiers throughout the data 
set, enabling us to extend our analysis through 2003.  The CPS also lists MSA codes 
for many observations as well as FIPS county codes beginning in 1996.  While we 
will be unable to investigate the health and utilization effects of MMC programs, we 
can more thoroughly investigate their effect on Medicaid enrollment.  Several papers 
have investigated the effect of MMC on health and utilization, while few have 
investigated the response of enrollment to MMC mandates. 
Medicaid managed care mandates may have an effect on enrollment if the 




eligible for the program.  Given that managed care insurance plans are more 
restrictive than traditional FFS plans, managed care mandates may reduce the 
attractiveness of the Medicaid program.  However, if managed care plans are 
successful in increasing the accessibility of primary and preventive care for enrollees, 
then managed care may actually increase the attractiveness of the Medicaid program. 
Few papers have studied the effect of MMC policies on Medicaid enrollment 
decisions.  One analysis, performed by Garrett, Davidoff, and Yemane (2003), used 
NHIS data to investigate whether women enrolled in welfare programs or children 
changed their Medicaid take-up decisions in response to mandatory MMC programs 
of various types.  They found that women did not alter their enrollment likelihood, 
nor did they find an effect on children’s enrollment overall.  The one exception was 
Black children, who were less likely to enroll in response to mandatory PCCM 
policies.   
Currie and Fahr (2005) also used NHIS data to analyze the effect of MMC 
policies on enrollment for a similar time period (1991-1994), though they focused on 
the effect of MMC penetration rates.  This variable was instrumented for similarly to 
our expenditure analysis above.  Like Garrett, Davidoff, and Yemane, Currie and 
Fahr found MMC penetration rates to have no effect on the Medicaid enrollment rates 
of children overall.  They did, however, find that a 20 percentage point increase in 
MMC enrollment induced a 2.5 percentage point decline in Medicaid enrollment 
among Black children and a 1.7 percentage point decline in Medicaid enrollment 
among toddlers.  Medicaid enrollment for poor school-age children, however, 




children may have been differentially affected by MMC policies in the early 1990s, 
but the effects are not large.  In addition, both of these studies only looked at the 
likelihood of enrollment in Medicaid, without differentiating between other insurance 
and uninsurance as alternatives.  There is a substantial difference between turning 
down Medicaid in favor of other insurance as opposed to becoming uninsured. 
 To investigate this question, we use a similar sample of individuals as used by 
Currie and Fahr in their 2005 paper.  We restrict our sample to children aged 0-14 in 
families earning up to 300 percent of poverty level income because these children are 
more likely to be eligible for Medicaid benefits.  This leaves us with a sample of 
323,586 children, or an average of 23,000 children per year for the years 1990-2003.  
Table 3.8 presents descriptive characteristics of the children in our sample.  Average 
family size fell very slightly across the study period, as did average number of 
siblings in both the under-6 and under-18 categories.  Similarly, the average age 
increased slightly and the percent of children under age 6 decreased, suggesting that 
fertility rates dropped slightly in this demographic.  The percentage of children living 
in female-headed households increased slightly across the analysis period as well.   
Turning to statistics on program participation, the percentage of children in 
families receiving welfare benefits fell a great deal between 1995 and 2003.  This is 
consistent with welfare reform efforts that were enacted in this time period.  The 
percentage of children in families receiving SSI increased from 1990 to 1995, but 
then fell gradually for the remainder of the study period.  Medicaid enrollment 




remainder of the study period35.  This trend is consistent with initial increases in 
welfare enrollment, followed by implementation of the SCHIP program which 
expanded the group of children eligible for Medicaid in many states.  Uninsured rates 
initially fell slightly, then rose again in the last few years of the study period. 
 We use sets of linear probability models to assess how substitution of 
Medicaid enrollment for other insurance or uninsurance is affected by mandatory 
MMC policies.  The instruments described above are now utilized as explanatory 
variables.  The mixed mandatory and mandatory PCCM variables are combined into a 
single mandatory PCCM variable to simplify the analysis.  Recall that mixed 
mandatory policies were much more closely connected to PCCM enrollment than to 
HMO enrollment.  This suggests that mixed mandatory policies can be viewed as 
analogous to mandatory PCCM policies, enabling their consolidation.  This structure 
enables us to estimate how take-up of Medicaid benefits was affected by mandatory 
MMC policies36.  A variety of demographic controls are included in these 
specifications, including gender, race, living in a female-headed household, and 
categories for a variety of income levels with respect to the poverty line.  Program 
participation variables for welfare and SSI are included, as are state unemployment 
rates and state poverty rates.  We also include fixed effects for states and years as 
well as interactions between year fixed effects and dummy variables for poverty 
categories.  State-specific trend variables are included in all specifications. 
                                                 
35 For the years 1990-1994 and 2001-2003, there are inconsistencies between the Medicaid enrollment 
variable and the child Medicaid enrollment recode variable.  The latter variable is more consistent with 
Medicaid enrollment for the years 1995-2000 when the two variables are internally consistent, so the 
child Medicaid recode variable is used throughout to determine enrollment in Medicaid. 
36 This structure is more similar to the Garrett, Davidoff, and Yemane analysis than the Currie and Fahr 




 The policy variables are constructed slightly differently in this section.  Three 
sets of policy variables are utilized.  One set is the same as those used above with the 
mixed mandatory and PCCM variables combined as described above.  These 
represent the percent of poor people subject to a particular Medicaid policy 
environment within a state.  The second set is constructed similarly to the state-level 
variables, but at the MSA-level instead.  The third set is the county-level variables 
constructed by UI.  These variables equal zero or one and can be interpreted as zero 
percent or 100 percent of poor people in the county being subject to a particular 
policy environment.  Observations from the CPS are linked to the most local level 
policy data possible.  When county is reported, then county-level data is connected to 
it.  If not and MSA is reported, then the MSA-level data is connected to it.  If neither 
county nor MSA is reported, then state-level data is used.  This strategy enables 
observations to be connected with the most specific information available. 
 Table 3.9 reports results for these regressions.  The first panel reports 
specifications including the explanatory variables without any interaction terms, 
while the second and third panels include interactions between the explanatory 
variables and race dummies or poverty categories, respectively.  The first panel 
reveals that control variables affect Medicaid insurance rates as expected.  For 
example, children of single moms are more likely to be insured by Medicaid and less 
likely to have private insurance or be uninsured.  Similarly, children in families 
receiving SSI or welfare benefits are much more likely to receive Medicaid.  Due to 
space constraints, poverty category coefficients are not reported, but, as expected, 




The statistically insignificant coefficient of -0.005 on PercentMand in column 
one in the first panel indicates that the percentage of poor individuals subject to a 
particular policy environment does not impact Medicaid enrollment.  In column 4, the 
coefficient of -0.009 on PctMandHMO is statistically significant, suggesting a very 
small decline in take-up in response to mandatory HMO enrollment.  For example, 
living in a county with a mandatory HMO policy reduces the likelihood of Medicaid 
take-up by 0.9 percentage points.  Living in an MSA in which 50 percent of the poor 
population lives in a mandatory HMO county reduces take-up by only 0.45 
percentage points.  Columns 5 and 6 suggest that those who leave Medicaid have 
alternate insurance options and substitute into another insurance program instead of 
being uninsured.  Mandatory PCCM policies do not appear to affect Medicaid take-
up. 
 The second panel presents results including separate effects for Black and 
Hispanic children.  Coefficients on control variables are not reported but are similar 
in magnitude and significance to the first panel.  The first specification suggests that 
expansions in mandatory MMC policies induced greater take-up of Medicaid benefits 
among Black children, increasing the percentage of Black children that were insured 
at all.  Hispanic children respond in the opposite direction.  The magnitude of these 
effects is not much larger than those reported in the first panel and represents 1.2 
percentage point increases and 1.5 percentage point falls in Medicaid take-up, 
respectively.   Columns 4-6 report similar responses to mandatory HMO policies as 
the first panel, and minority children do not respond differentially.  Black and 




The magnitude of these responses remains small; take-up among Black children is 
increased by 1.9 percentage points in a mandatory PCCM county and take-up among 
Hispanic children fell by 2.2 percentage points.  The substitution effect of the fall in 
Medicaid among Hispanic children is split between other insurance and uninsurance. 
 The third panel of Table 3.9 investigates how individuals in varying income 
categories are differentially affected by mandatory MMC policies.  While those living 
in families earning under 300 percent of the poverty line are certainly more likely to 
be eligible, and therefore enrolled, in Medicaid than those living in families earning 
more than that cut-off, there may also be variation within the under-300 percent 
group.  For example, those in the highest income category are likely to have greater 
access to private insurance than those in the lowest income category.  For the poverty 
interaction terms, we simplified the analysis by creating three categories out of the 
original nine: less than100 percent of the poverty line, 100 to 200 percent of the 
poverty line, and 200 to 300 percent of the poverty line.  The first of the three, less 
than 100 percent of the poverty line, is the omitted category. 
 The results reported in column 1 suggest that children in families earning less 
than 200 percent of poverty-level income may be slightly less likely to be enrolled in 
Medicaid, while those in families earning 200 to 300 percent of poverty are slightly 
more likely to be enrolled in Medicaid.  When HMO and PCCM policies are included 
separately, the results suggest that children in families earning less than 200 percent 
of the poverty line substitute from Medicaid into other insurance.  As before, the 
magnitude of the response is small: the likelihood of take-up falls by 1.7 percentage 




their take-up in response to mandatory HMO policies: the coefficient of 0.016 on 
their interaction term nearly cancels out the coefficient of -0.017 on the non-
interacted PctMandHMO variable.  This group is, however, slightly more likely to 
take-up Medicaid benefits in response to mandatory PCCM policies. 
Overall, these results suggest very small-magnitude enrollment responses to 
mandatory MMC policies.  In general, Medicaid take-up falls in response to 
mandatory HMO policies, particularly among the poorest two income categories.  
The response to mandatory PCCM policies is mixed.  Black children and those in the 
highest income category increase Medicaid take-up, while Hispanic children reduce 
their take-up.  Considering the magnitude of our results, they are not vastly different 
from those found in previous literature.  The main difference is the direction of the 
impact on Black children.  This difference could stem from the fact that our analysis 
covers a much longer time period, including nearly all of the mandatory MMC policy 
expansions.  It is interesting to note that most of the reduced Medicaid take-up 
substitutes into other insurance, suggesting that mandatory enrollment policies do not 
result in increases in uninsurance among poor children.  It is also interesting to note 
that increases in Medicaid take-up often come at the expense of the uninsured 
category, suggesting that mandatory PCCM policies may slightly reduce the rate of 






 On net, it does not appear that Medicaid managed care programs benefit state 
budgets.  To the contrary, if anything, it appears that managed care programs are 
more expensive per enrollee than traditional FFS Medicaid programs.  This is 
particularly true for HMO-style managed care, while PCCM programs do not appear 
to affect per enrollee expenditures.  Our analysis exploits the variation in managed 
care enrollment within and across states.  It includes state and year fixed effects in 
addition to state-specific trend variables in order to address concerns of legislative 
endogeneity.  For example, if states enact or expand a Medicaid managed care policy 
in response to growing program expenditures, the inclusion of state trend variables 
should effectively control for this possibility.   
 There are several possible reasons why Medicaid HMO plans may be more 
expensive than FFS plans.  First, many states contract out to several HMO insurers 
simultaneously, which potentially reduces the efficiency of the Medicaid program, 
particularly compared to situations where all Medicaid beneficiaries are under the 
same administrative umbrella.  This stems from the fixed costs of running an 
insurance plan spreading among smaller groups of individuals.  In addition, there is 
an added administrative cost within the Medicaid program to setting up and 
maintaining the managed care contracts.  It has also been well documented that states 
tried to maintain safety net care for the uninsured when designing managed care 
programs.  This practice has tended to favor less efficient Medicaid-only plans and 




 It is also worth noting that many individuals are on Medicaid for a relatively 
short period of time.  Thus even if the benefits of managed care in the form of 
accessibility and utilization of primary and preventive care are large enough to offset 
the increase in expenditures, it may be unlikely that the Medicaid program would reap 
the benefits of these improvements.  For example, if a family is enrolled in Medicaid 
for six months, that family may take advantage of access to primary care to schedule 
physicals and treat smaller health problems before they become emergent.  However, 
the family may no longer be enrolled in Medicaid by the time the family’s improved 
health would benefit the program financially.  Thus it could be true that the larger 
expenditures reflect greater usage of primary care for individuals enrolled in the 
program for a short duration. 
 Several papers have been written on the impact of MMC on utilization and 
health outcomes.  Many studies find little relationship, and those that find a 
relationship have mixed findings.  For example, Duggan (2004) finds that Medicaid 
managed care programs in California have no effect on infant health, while Aizer, 
Currie, and Moretti (2007) find MMC in California to be associated with reduced 
usage of prenatal care and worse birth outcomes.  However, Howell et al (2004) find 
a positive association between MMC and prenatal care in Ohio, though they find no 
effect of MMC on birth outcomes.  Kaestner, Dubay, and Kenney (2002) perform a 
national analysis, and find no association between MMC and infant health outcomes, 
nor do they find a significant effect on utilization of prenatal care. 
There is mixed evidence within the literature that focuses solely on the impact 




no impact on primary care utilization for adults and a reduction for children, while 
Garrett, Davidoff, and Yemane (2003) find some reduction in utilization of primary 
care for women and increases in primary care for children.  Currie and Fahr (2005) 
find mixed results for primary care usage among children, and Long and Coughlin 
(2001) find no difference in reported access, utilization, or satisfaction with care 
between FFS and MMC enrollees in rural Minnesota.  Baker and Afendulis (2005) 
find increases in outpatient care utilization and reductions in emergency room usage, 
though also find increases in reports of putting off care.  Overall, it does not appear 
that increases in Medicaid expenditures are driven by improvements in primary care 
utilization that would translate into health and financial benefits that aren’t realized 
until after exiting the Medicaid program.  Nor do these increases appear to be 
justified by improvements in health outcomes. 
Our enrollment results suggest that mandatory HMO policies may have 
reduced expenditures slightly through reducing the number of people enrolled in 
Medicaid.  If those who exit the program are healthier, part of the increase in per 
enrollee expenditures could be driven by this reduction in take-up.  However, given 
that the size of the effect on enrollment is very small, the size of this potential bias is 
small as well.  The increase in Medicaid enrollment driven by mandatory PCCM 
policies could, likewise, increase the size of the Medicaid budget through increasing 
the size of the program.  It is important to recall, however, that the size of these 
enrollment responses is small, and thus is likely to have only a slight effect on 
program expenditures.  
Year




Primary Care Case 
Management Prepaid Health Plan
1991 10.8% 5.2% 3.2% 1.7%
1992 13.1% 5.7% 4.2% 2.7%
1993 16.0% 6.6% 5.0% 3.9%
1994 24.6% 12.2% 8.8% 2.7%
1995 34.4% 15.2% 11.3% 7.2%
1996 38.9% 22.4% 12.5% 7.3%
1997 47.5% 25.0% 14.1% 10.7%
1998 52.5% 35.9% 13.3% 15.3%
1999 55.0% 36.0% 13.8% 24.3%
2000 54.9% 35.1% 14.2% 23.5%
2001 56.0% 35.4% 14.8% 21.7%
2002 56.9% 37.3% 14.4% 21.9%
2003 58.4% 38.1% 14.7% 21.5%
2004 60.0% 38.4% 13.6% 23.5%
2005 62.2% 39.4% 14.7% 25.2%
Table 3.1: Enrollment in Medicaid Managed Care 1991-2005
Percent of Medicaid Enrollees in:
*Note: columns 2-4 add up to greater than column 1 because an individual may be enrolled in a dental 
or behavioral health managed care plan in addition to a medical managed care plan.
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Year
Mandatory     
HMO




Voluntary      
PCCM
1990 3.5% 21.0% 3.1% 3.3%
1991 3.6% 22.4% 3.2% 5.2%
1992 3.7% 27.2% 7.8% 11.6%
1993 3.9% 28.6% 9.9% 12.9%
1994 7.6% 29.3% 15.8% 11.8%
1995 11.4% 38.6% 23.2% 12.6%
1996 21.5% 31.5% 26.4% 12.2%
1997 32.9% 25.9% 31.6% 9.8%
1998 48.8% 17.6% 31.7% 8.2%
1999 55.0% 13.6% 33.3% 8.6%
2000 59.1% 11.8% 33.3% 8.1%
2001 58.4% 12.0% 34.6% 7.8%
2002 59.1% 11.9% 34.6% 7.9%
2003 60.0% 11.8% 34.6% 7.8%
Table 3.2: Percent of Impoverished Population Subject to the Following        
Medicaid Managed Care Policies
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year 1990 1995 2000 2005
Medicaid:
    Inpatient 23317.5 48275.6 36654.8 48949.8
    Outpatient 12470.6 21196.8 19353.4 27839.3
    Mental Health 2761.0 8501.5 7331.9 7244.6
    Prescription Drugs 6073.6 9639.1 16574.8 27046.7
    Managed Care 259.4 2089.4 27341.6 46160.2
    Medicare Payments 1468.9 3802.8 4163.7 6855.6
    Dental 905.1 1771.6 1795.3 2985.2
    Other 42857.6 75637.8 81849.0 97471.5
    Total Net Expenditures 90547.4 171541.6 195506.2 265156.7
Administrative Total Net Expenditures 4560.2 8672.5 10577.1 13354.1
Medicaid/SCHIP:
    Inpatient 112.9 204.3
    Outpatient 201.4 436.4
    Mental Health 47.0 58.2
    Prescription Drugs 77.9 183.1
    Case Management 13.3 16.6
    Medicare Payments 0.0 0.0
    Dental 48.2 122.9
    Premiums 467.3 582.1
    Other 129.9 182.9
    Total Net Expenditures 1097.9 1786.5
SCHIP:
    Inpatient 22.7 301.5
    Outpatient 119.6 445.9
    Mental Healtht 6.3 31.6
    Prescription Drugs 29.9 268.1
    Case Management 4.5 16.8
    Dental 24.4 98.8
    Premiums 1296.1 3051.1
    Other 179.8 436.4
    Total Net Expenditures 1683.5 4650.2
Table 3.3: Medicaid Expenditures by Category, Selected Years  (in Millions of 2000 $)
*Expenditures are deflated by the CPI-U Index.
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State 1990 1995 2000 2003
AK 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
AL 0.0% 0.0% 89.4% 100.0%
AR 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
AZ 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
CA 1.8% 5.8% 86.3% 87.5%
CO 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
CT 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0%
DC 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0%
DE 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0%
FL 0.0% 59.6% 100.0% 100.0%
GA 0.0% 15.6% 100.0% 100.0%
HI 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
IA 5.9% 82.2% 97.7% 97.8%
ID 0.0% 3.1% 3.8% 3.4%
IL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
IN 0.0% 31.2% 100.0% 100.0%
KS 48.0% 49.2% 100.0% 100.0%
KY 97.6% 97.6% 99.6% 99.6%
LA 0.0% 12.0% 11.9% 11.1%
MA 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
MD 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
ME 0.0% 0.0% 63.4% 100.0%
MI 0.0% 99.8% 100.0% 100.0%
MN 28.1% 48.0% 79.7% 85.3%
MO 13.3% 13.5% 55.2% 61.1%
MS 0.0% 9.0% 100.0% 100.0%
MT 0.0% 70.6% 96.7% 97.1%
NC 0.6% 36.2% 100.0% 100.0%
ND 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
NE 0.0% 0.0% 43.6% 48.4%
NH 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
NJ 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0%
NM 0.0% 89.2% 100.0% 100.0%
NV 0.0% 0.0% 71.4% 73.3%
NY 0.0% 0.0% 49.5% 50.0%
OH 5.2% 5.4% 51.6% 53.3%
OK 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0%
OR 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
PA 0.0% 43.1% 100.0% 100.0%
RI 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
SC 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
SD 0.0% 42.4% 100.0% 100.0%
TN 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
TX 0.0% 5.0% 59.2% 63.8%
UT 73.3% 71.2% 70.4% 73.5%
VA 0.0% 79.9% 85.2% 85.1%
VT 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0%
WA 4.4% 97.2% 93.0% 79.2%
WI 35.8% 40.3% 80.5% 81.3%
WV 0.0% 56.4% 98.0% 100.0%
WY 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
USA 6.3% 33.2% 77.2% 78.4%
Table 3.4: Percent of State Impoverished Population Subject to Mandatory 
Medicaid Managed Care Policies, Selected Years
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Year HMO Only Mixed Mandatory PCCM Only
1990 3.2% 0.3% 2.8%
1991 3.3% 0.3% 3.0%
1992 3.3% 2.8% 5.0%
1993 3.5% 3.6% 6.4%
1994 6.8% 6.8% 9.1%
1995 9.2% 12.1% 11.9%
1996 14.7% 13.7% 13.6%
1997 20.6% 18.9% 13.6%
1998 29.8% 24.0% 13.7%
1999 33.5% 24.1% 15.5%
2000 37.9% 22.9% 16.5%
2001 37.1% 22.8% 17.5%
2002 37.5% 23.2% 17.3%
2003 38.0% 23.6% 16.9%
Table 3.5: Percent of the Impoverished Population Subject to the 
Following Mandatory Policies
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% Pop in Mandatory MMC 
County 0.459 0.449 0.403
(0.030)*** (0.031)*** (0.043)***
% Pop in Mandatory HMO 
County 0.508 0.493 0.480 -0.070 -0.069 -0.035
(0.032)*** (0.033)*** (0.057)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.029)
% Pop in Mixed Mandatory 
County 0.120 0.102 0.066 0.228 0.232 0.278
(0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.030)** (0.033)*** (0.034)*** (0.040)***
% Pop in Mandatory PCCM 
County -0.066 -0.076 -0.026 0.480 0.472 0.360
(0.020)*** (0.022)*** (0.031) (0.024)*** (0.025)*** (0.040)***
% Medicaid in SSI -0.015 0.369 0.111 0.112 -0.326 0.340
(0.254) (0.310) (0.209) (0.274) (0.174)* (0.236)
% Medicaid in AFDC/TANF 0.394 0.153 0.271 0.148 0.045 -0.123
(0.080)*** (0.101) (0.065)*** (0.105) (0.055) (0.063)*
Unemployment Rate 0.020 0.008 -0.008 -0.007 0.000 0.001
(0.009)** (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Poverty Rate 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)* (0.002)*
Constant -0.097 -0.522 -0.213 -0.071 -0.196 -0.050 -0.028 -0.061 -0.010
(0.028)*** (0.088)*** (0.089)** (0.023)*** (0.065)*** (0.070) (0.016)* (0.050) (0.054)
F-statistic for Instrument 239.21 216.28 86.30 185.05 165.08 33.81 188.34 168.68 41.96
Observations 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663 663
R-squared 0.85 0.86 0.90 0.86 0.86 0.92 0.85 0.85 0.90
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clustered SE N N N N N N N N N
State Trends N N Y N N Y N N Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
MMC Penetration % Medicaid in HMO % Medicaid in PCCM
Table 3.6: First Stage Relationship Between % of Impoverished Population in Mandatory Counties                                           
and Actual Medicaid Managed Care Penetration Rates
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MMC Penetration 0.124 0.112 0.076
(0.070)* (0.049)** (0.065)
% Medicaid in HMO 0.243 0.154 0.169
(0.102)** (0.063)** (0.084)**
% Medicaid in PCCM 0.046 0.119 -0.006
(0.065) (0.054)** (0.064)
% Medicaid in SSI 3.408 3.178 3.403 3.265
(0.171)*** (0.189)*** (0.172)*** (0.196)***
% Medicaid in 
AFDC/TANF 0.553 0.555 0.553 0.511
(0.085)*** (0.111)*** (0.084)*** (0.104)***
Unemployment Rate 0.046 0.030 0.049 0.032
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)***
Poverty Rate 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.002)** (0.003) (0.002)**
Constant 8.182 7.092 7.088 8.193 7.076 7.085
(0.072)*** (0.108)*** (0.124)*** (0.075)*** (0.104)*** (0.121)***
Observations 663 663 663 663 663 663
R-squared 0.84 0.93 0.96 0.85 0.93 0.96
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clustered SE N N N N N N
State Trends N N Y N N Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3.7a: Instrumental Variables Regression Results
Ln of Per Enrollee Medicaid Expenditures
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MMC Penetration 0.168 0.126 0.106
(0.092)* (0.072)* (0.108)
% Medicaid in HMO 0.272 0.133 0.111
(0.138)** (0.098) (0.136)
% Medicaid in PCCM 0.072 0.135 0.114
(0.092) (0.083) (0.124)
% Medicaid in SSI 4.425 4.886 4.447 4.884
(0.305)*** (0.502)*** (0.310)*** (0.500)***
% Medicaid in 
AFDC/TANF 0.573 0.626 0.584 0.635
(0.153)*** (0.208)*** (0.151)*** (0.210)***
Unemployment Rate 0.004 0.010 0.008 0.012
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
Poverty Rate 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 5.534 4.654 4.570 5.540 4.622 4.555
(0.094)*** (0.157)*** (0.196)*** (0.096)*** (0.151)*** (0.193)***
Observations 661 661 661 661 661 661
R-squared 0.83 0.9 0.93 0.83 0.9 0.93
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clustered SE N N N N N N
State Trends N N Y N N Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3.7b: Instrumental Variables Regression Results
Ln of Per Enrollee Medicaid Administrative Expenditures
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MMC Penetration -0.014 -0.014 -0.017
(0.011) (0.007)** (0.009)*
% Medicaid in HMO -0.032 -0.020 -0.029
(0.017)* (0.011)* (0.013)**
% Medicaid in PCCM 0.000 -0.013 -0.007
(0.009) (0.006)** (0.007)
% Medicaid in SSI -0.552 -0.515 -0.548 -0.526
(0.031)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.032)***
% Medicaid in 
AFDC/TANF -0.049 -0.079 -0.049 -0.074
(0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)***
Unemployment Rate -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.003
(0.001)*** (0.001)* (0.001)*** (0.001)**
Poverty Rate 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Constant 0.112 0.244 0.211 0.111 0.246 0.212
(0.006)*** (0.022)*** (0.017)*** (0.007)*** (0.021)*** (0.017)***
Observations 663 663 663 663 663 663
R-squared 0.79 0.91 0.96 0.79 0.91 0.96
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Clustered SE N N N N N N
State Trends N N Y N N Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3.7c: Instrumental Variables Regression Results
Medicaid Enrollment as a Percent of State Population
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1990 1995 2000 2003
Demographics:
   Average Age 6.66 6.75 6.95 7.04
   % Black (incl. mixed race Black) 20.6% 20.9% 21.4% 22.1%
   % Hispanic 15.3% 19.2% 23.3% 26.3%
   % Male 51.3% 51.0% 51.4% 51.2%
   % with Mom only 30.6% 32.8% 32.7% 33.8%
   Average # People per Family 4.44 4.35 4.34 4.29
   % Aged < 6 42.9% 42.8% 39.9% 39.8%
   Average Number of Siblings Aged <6 0.58 0.54 0.49 0.49
   Average Number of Siblings Aged <18 1.56 1.49 1.49 1.46
SSI/AFDC/TANF Participation:
   % in Families with SSI 3.0% 4.8% 4.2% 3.9%
   Average Family SSI income 121 241 256 246
   % in Families with AFDC/TANF 18.4% 20.2% 10.7% 7.5%
   Average Family AFDC/TANF income 779 918 410 289
Income:
   Average Family Income (Total) 19757 22159 26483 28016
   Average Family Earnings 17301 19089 23668 24942
   Average Family Income (Other) 2456 3070 2815 3074
Insurance Characteristics:
   % Enrolled in Medicaid 21.7% 35.6% 33.2% 33.3%
   % Enrolled in Other Insurance 55.9% 45.8% 48.2% 45.3%
   % Uninsured 22.4% 18.6% 18.6% 21.4%
Total Number of Kids 23,482 22,980 18,870 32,042
Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics for CPS Sample
* The second version of each insurance rate includes kids as being on Medicaid only if the child-
Medicaid recode equals 1; the first includes kids in Medicaid if either the Medicaid indicator 







% Pop in Mandatory MMC 
County -0.005 0.000 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
% Pop in Mandatory HMO 
County -0.009 0.012 -0.002
(0.004)** (0.004)*** (0.004)
% Pop in Mandatory PCCM 
County -0.001 -0.008 0.010
(0.003) (0.004)** (0.004)***
Male 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
With Mom Only 0.057 -0.016 -0.040 0.057 -0.016 -0.040
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Black 0.031 -0.060 0.029 0.031 -0.060 0.029
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Hispanic 0.029 -0.133 0.103 0.029 -0.132 0.103
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Aged under 6 0.066 -0.035 -0.032 0.066 -0.035 -0.031
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
# Siblings under 6 0.019 -0.006 -0.013 0.019 -0.006 -0.013
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
# Siblings under 18 -0.008 0.027 -0.019 -0.008 0.027 -0.019
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Family Receives SSI 
Benefits 0.291 -0.213 -0.077 0.291 -0.214 -0.077
(0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Family Receives 
AFDC/TANF Benefits 0.543 -0.290 -0.253 0.543 -0.290 -0.253
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
State Unemployment Rate -0.003 0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.002 0.000
(0.002)* (0.002)* (0.002) (0.002)* (0.002) (0.002)
State Poverty Rate 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.226 0.275 0.499 0.223 0.282 0.495
(0.017)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)***
Observations 323586 323586 323586 323586 323586 323586
R-squared 0.44 0.37 0.11 0.44 0.37 0.11
State, Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
Poverty Category*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3.9a: Impact of Mandatory Managed Care Policies on Medicaid Enrollment                     







% Pop in Mandatory MMC 
County -0.004 -0.002 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
% Pop in Mandatory HMO 
County -0.009 0.013 -0.004
(0.004)** (0.005)*** (0.004)
% Pop in Mandatory PCCM 
County 0.001 -0.013 0.012
(0.004) (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Black*% in Mandatory 
MMC County 0.012 0.003 -0.016
(0.004)*** (0.005) (0.005)***
Hispanic*% in Mandatory 
MMC County -0.015 0.004 0.011
(0.004)*** (0.004) (0.005)**
Black*% Pop in Mandatory 
HMO County 0.004 -0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Black*% Pop in Mandatory 
PCCM County 0.019 0.008 -0.026
(0.005)*** (0.006) (0.006)***
Hispanic*% Pop in 
Mandatory HMO County -0.008 -0.001 0.009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)*
Hispanic*% Pop in 
Mandatory PCCM County -0.022 0.010 0.011
(0.005)*** (0.005)* (0.006)**
Male 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.001
Constant 0.230 0.275 0.494 0.227 0.283 0.491
(0.017)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)***
Observations 323586 323586 323586 323586 323586 323586
R-squared 0.44 0.37 0.11 0.44 0.37 0.11
State, Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
Poverty Category*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3.9b: Impact of Mandatory Managed Care Policies on Medicaid Enrollment                      







% Pop in Mandatory MMC 
County -0.008 -0.004 0.012
(0.004)* (0.004) (0.004)***
% Pop in Mandatory HMO 
County -0.017 0.012 0.004
(0.006)*** (0.005)** (0.005)
% Pop in Mandatory PCCM 
County -0.001 -0.016 0.017
(0.005) (0.004)*** (0.005)***
100-199% Pov.*% Pop in 
Mandatory MMC County -0.002 0.014 -0.011
(0.005) (0.005)** (0.005)**
200-299% Pov.*% Pop in 
Mandatory MMC County 0.013 -0.002 -0.011
(0.005)*** (0.005) (0.005)**
100-199% Pov.*% Pop in 
Mandatory HMO County 0.007 0.010 -0.017
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)***
100-199% Pov.*% Pop in 
Mandatory PCCM County -0.009 0.016 -0.007
(0.006) (0.006)*** (0.006)
200-299% Pov.*% Pop in 
Mandatory HMO County 0.016 -0.014 -0.002
(0.006)*** (0.006)** (0.006)
200-299% Pov.*% Pop in 
Mandatory PCCM County 0.011 0.005 -0.016
(0.005)** (0.006) (0.005)***
Constant 0.227 0.276 0.497 0.224 0.282 0.494
(0.017)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.018)***
Observations 323586 323586 323586 323586 323586 323586
R-squared 0.44 0.37 0.11 0.44 0.37 0.11
State, Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
Poverty Category*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3.9c: Impact of Mandatory Managed Care Policies on Medicaid Enrollment                    
vs. Private Enrollment and Uninsurance, Total Sample & Poverty Level Interactions
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deflated to 2000 $
MMC Enrollment
(%)
Vendor payment data comes from the Social Security Bulletin Annual Statistical Supplement, Table 8e, deflated using the 
CPI-U index.  Managed Care Penetration Rates come from CMS Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment Reports. 
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